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Abstract: The electronic processing of health information provides con-
siderable benefits to patients and health care providers while at the same
time creating serious risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of the data. The Internet provides a conduit for rapid and uncontrolled
dispersion and trafficking of illicitly obtained private health information,
with far-reaching consequences to unsuspecting victims. To address such
threats to electronic private health information, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services enacted the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act Security Rule, which thus far has received little at-
tention in legal literature. This Article presents a critique of the Security
Rule. It argues that the Rule suffers from several defects relating to its
narrow definition of "covered entities," the limited scope of information
it allows data subjects to obtain about their health information, the
vagueness and incompleteness of the Rule's standards and implementa-
tion specifications, and the lack of a private cause of action. This Article
explores the difficult problem of crafting static regulations to adequately
address rapidly changing computer and communications technologies
and associated security threats to private health information. In addition,
it develops detailed recommendations for improving safeguards for elec-
tronically processed health records.
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INTRODUCTION
The electronic processing of health data provides invaluable bene-
fits to patients and health care providers. These benefits include speed
and flexibility of information processing, retrieval, and communication;
long-term cost savings due to increased efficiency; and the availability
of powerful computational techniques that can contribute to improved
patient outcomes.' Unfortunately, some of these same attributes enable
the operation of a market in illicitly obtained private health informa-
tion. The Internet provides a nearly ideal channel for trafficking in
such information because it permits the information to be transmitted
anywhere in the world quickly, cheaply, and with relatively little risk of
detection.% This Article analyzes the threats to electronic health records
and the deficiencies of regulations that have been enacted to address
them.3 It also develops recommendations for improving safeguards for
these records.4
The risks associated with the electronic storage and transmission
of personal information in general and health data in particular are
indeed grave. A New Year's Day 2006 article in the New York Times in-
cluded the following statement:
Every week seems to bring reports of a new breach of the com-
puter networks that contain our most intimate personal infor-
mation. Scores of companies—including Bank of America,
MasterCard, ChoicePoint and Marriott International—have
admitted to security lapses that exposed millions of people's
financial information to potential abuse by identity thieves. 5
Another article reported that between February and June of 2005 alone,
"businesses, universities, and government agencies lost ... ten million
records" and that, according to a Gallup poll conducted in August of
2005, nearly one out of five Americans experienced identity theft. 6 In
I See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Elec-
tronic Stealth Records, 2007 U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with au-
thors) (discussing the advantages of electronic health records).
2 See Young B. Choi et al., Challenges Associated with Privacy in Health Care Industry: Im-
plementation of HIPAA and the Security Rules, 301 MED. St's. 57,60 (2006) (stating that pri-
vate information can be distributed worldwide within seconds).
3 See infra notes 5-30,48-193 and accompanying text-
-1 See infra notes 199-333 and accompanying text.
John Schwartz, The Nation: Spy Game; What Are You Lookin' at?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2006, ,§ 4, at 1.
6 Daniel B. Prieto, Data Mine: Stopping Identity Theft, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19,2005, at
17.
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May of 2006, a burglary at the home of a Department of Veterans Affairs
employee resulted in the well-publicized theft of discs containing names,
birthdates, and Social Security numbers of as many as 26.5 million mili-
tary veterans.? Even private cell phone use is vulnerable to public disclo-
sure.8 Reportedly, dozens of Internet-based companies sell information
concerning calls made and received by cell phone users, which they ob-
tain by posing as customers and asking for copies of bills. 9
The confidentiality of personal health information appears to be
compromised with disturbing frequency. A report that focused on dis-
carded hard drives and disk sanitization practices disclosed that in Au-
gust of 2002, the U.S. Veterans Administration Medical Center in Indi-
anapolis sold or donated 139 of its old computers without removing
confidential information contained on their hard drives, including the
names of veterans who had AIDS and mental illnesses.") An earlier pa-
per published by the British Medical Association reported numerous
instances of private health information abuse, including the case of a
banker who served on a state health commission and obtained a list of
all cancer patients in his state, which he used to single out these indi-
viduals and call in their loans." On April 26, 2006, Aetna announced
that a laptop computer containing personal information concerning
38,000 consumers had been stolen, and on May 12, 2006, a newspaper
article reported that a computer breach may have led to the theft of
personal information relating to 60,000 patients who visited Ohio Uni-
versity's health center. 12 Other reported incidents include an inadver-
tent Internet posting of identifying information and details of the sex
lives of ninety psychotherapy patients, an inadvertent posting of sixty
children's psychological records on the University of Montana's web-
site, a hacker's illegal downloading of thousands of patients' medical
files from a university medical center, and the stealing of health infor-
7 David Stout & Torn Zeller, Vast Data Cache About Veterans Has Been Stolen, N.Y. Tinos,
May 23, 2006, at Al.
8 See Sheryl Harris, Are Your Cell Phone Records Safe? Web-Based Companies Offer Data Tell-
ing Numbers You Called for as Little as $100, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 14, 2006, at Al (reporting
that one company charges only $100 for information about a customer's last 100 calls).
9 Id.
Io Simson L. Garfinkel & Ahhi Shelat, Remembrance of Data Passed: A Study of Disk Saniti-
zation Practices, 1 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 17, 17 (2003).
Ross]. ANDERSON, BRITISH MED. ASSN, SECURITY IN CLINICAL INFORMATION SYS-
TEMS 5 (1996) (citation omitted).
12 Jennifer Gonzalez, 3rd Computer Breach at OU Within 3 Weeks: Records Involve 60,000
Who Used Health Center, PLAIN DEALER, May 12, 2006, at Al; see Press Release, Aetna, State-
ment of CEO and President Ronald A. Williams on Data Security (Apr. 26, 2006), available
at littp://www.aettia.cominews/2006/pr_20060426.htm.
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mation belonging to military personnel and their families from a con-
tractor's database. 13
Why would anyone want to obtain the health information of oth-
ers? The reasons are numerous. Private health information can be use-
ful to employers who wish to hire and retain the healthiest employees,"
lenders and other businesses with a stake in individuals' financial fu-
tures and thus in their health statuses, 15 drug companies that wish to
influence doctors' prescribing decisions, 16 advertisers and marketers
who wish to tailor their material for particular audiences, 17 health in-
surers making eligibility and premium rate decisions concerning indi-
vidual insurance policies, and even educational institutions that might
wish to recruit and accept students with the greatest potential for suc-
cess and longevity. In a world in which electronic health information
" DANIEL J. SoLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 54-55 (2004); see also Nicolas P. Terry, To
IIIPAA, a Son: Assessing the Technical, Cana/Anal, and Legal Frameworks for Patient Safety Infor-
mation, 12 WIDENER L. REv, 133, 163 (2005) (describing other examples of dysfunctional
"privacy and security systems").
14
 ANDERSON, AVM note 11, at 5 (reporting that as of 1995, "over half of America's
largest 500 companies admitted using health records to make hiring and other personnel
decisions"). It should he noted, however, that these health records were most likely lawfully
obtained because the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA") permits medical
testing of applicants and employees with some limitations, though it forbids discrimination
against qualified employees with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), (d) (2000). Em-
ployees who are sick or vulnerable to illness are often unappealing to employers because
they can cause absenteeism, productivity, scheduling, and morale problems in the work-
place and can raise health insurance costs. Questions concerning the meaning of the
terms 'qualified" and "disability," and thus the ADA's scope of coverage, have generated
considerable litigation. See generally Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the
ADA, 52 Am. U. L. REV. 1213 (2003).
IS ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit
reference agency to trade health records).
16 Id. at 5 (stating that a U.S. drug company purchased a health systems company and
obtained a prescription database for fifty-six million people, which it was planning to
search for individuals whose prescriptions suggested that they suffered from depression
and could benefit from Prozac, a drug produced by the company); see also Robert Stein-
brook, For Sale: Physicians' Prescribing Data, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2745, 2745 (2006) (re-
porting that during the last two decades, health care information companies routinely
have purchased electronic prescription records from pharmacies and elsewhere, which
they then sold to drug manufacturers); Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object as Drug Makers Learn
Who's Prescribing What, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, at Al (describing computerized records
with information concerning physicians and the drugs they prescribe that are used by
drug sales representatives to influence doctors to write more prescriptions for drugs pro-
duced by their companies or fewer prescriptions of a competitor's drugs).
17 Prieto, supra note 6, at 18 (asserting that "(als advertisers have sought greater return
on their dollar, they are increasingly relying on personal data to target ads" based on par-
ticular attributes); see also Terry, supra note 13, at 162 (stating that PHI is "valuable for
secondary uses" such as marketing).
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can be easily stolen or accessed, it could also become increasingly ap-
pealing to blackmailers and other criminals.t 8 For example, after a
computer was stolen from a gefieral medical practice, two prominent
women received letters from blackmailers who threatened to publicize
the fact that the women had undergone abortions. 19 Even potential
romantic partners looking for a low-risk mate might try to obtain per-
sonal health information if it were easily accessible.
Trafficking in personal health information poses a significant risk
to the public. Once the data is dispersed on the Internet, it becomes
available to anyone who is willing to pay for it, 2° and it cannot be ex-
punged. Consequently, the harm to an individual from illicit or acci-
dental disclosure of health information is potentially unlimited. It is
quite possible for the affected individual to remain unaware of the dis-
closure and its consequences," and it may be difficult or impossible to
establish how the disclosure actually occurred. Loss or corruption of
health data can also require the duplication of painful medical tests or
even cause serious and life-threatening medical errors.
Americans are aware of these dangers. A 2005 National Consumer
Health Privacy Survey, which queried 2000 people, revealed that sixty-
seven percent of respondents were "somewhat" or "very concerned"
about the confidentiality of their medical records. 22 Furthermore, thir-
teen percent of respondents claimed that they had attempted to pro-
tect their own privacy by avoiding medical tests or visits to their regular
physicians, asking doctors to distort diagnoses, or paying for tests out-
of-pocket so that no medical documentation would be sent to insur-
ance companies. 23
To address the data security threats associated with the electronic
storage and transmission of private health information, the U.S. De-
Ig See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5; COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMM. BD ., NAT A L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTEC:TINO ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 3
(1997) (stating that hackers may penetrate computerized systems to steal data, destroy it,
or damage the system).
lg ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5.
24 See id. at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit reference agency to
trade health records).
21 See Prieto, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that the average victim becomes aware of iden-
tity theft only after fourteen months, but in some cases discovering the crime takes ten
years). This Article does not specifically address the theft of PHI, which could be hidden
more easily because the consumer will not see suspicious charges on her credit card or tell-
tale credit reports.
22 LYNNE "SAM" BISHOP ET AL., CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., NATIONAL CONSUMER
HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY 2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005),
23 Id. at 4.
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partment of Health and Human Services ("HHS") enacted the Security
Rule tinder the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA").24 The Security Rule is part of the larger HIPAA Privacy
Rule established in the HIPAA privacy regulations 25 promulgated pursu-
ant to HIPAA's statutory authority. 26
The HIPAA Security Rule, which became effective on April 20,
2005 for most covered entities,27 delineates administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability of electronic protected health information ("PHI"). 28 Under the
Rule, PHI includes "individually identifiable health information" that is
electronically or otherwise transmitted or maintained. 29 "Covered enti-
ties" include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
providers that transmit health information electronically.50
Many have criticized various aspects of the broader HIPAA Privacy
Rule,si but few have focused specifically on the regulations' Security
Rule. It is our view that the HIPAA Security Rule has serious delicien-
24 See 95 C.F.R. §§ 164.302—.318 (2006); .see also Security and Electronic Signature Stan-
dards, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,242, 93,292-43 (Aug. 12, 1998) (providing background concerning
the Security Rule's purpose).
22 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101—.534.
2° 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to 1320d-8 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
27 45 C.F.R. § 164.318. Small health plans were given an extended adjustment period
and were required to comply with the Rule by April 20, 2006. Id.
23 Id. §§ 164.308—.312.
29 Id. § 160.103.
3° 45 C, F.R. § 160.103 (2006). A health care clearinghouse is defined as follows:
[Ai public or private entity, including a billing service, repricing company,
community health management information system or community health in-
formation system, and "value-added" networks and switches, that does either
of the following functions:
(I) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information received from
another entity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data con-
tent into standard data elements or a standard transaction.
(2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or fa-
cilitates the processing of health information into nonstandard format or
nonstandard data content for the receiving entity.
Id.
31 See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, EXPOSED ONLINE: WHY THE NEW FEDERAL
14EALTH PRIVACY REGULATION DOESN'T' OFFER MIJCH PROTECTION TO INTERNET USERS 6-8
(2001) (discussing the fact that many health-related websites are not covered entities); So-
UWE, supra note 13, at 70 (stating that the "IIIPAA regulations have apparently pleased no-
body" because health care providers "complain that the regulations are too complicated,
cumbersome, and expensive to follow" and privacy advocates "find the regulations weak and
ineffective").
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cies that hinder its efficacy as a mechanism to impede the operation of
a market in illicitly obtained PHI.
These deficiencies are of four principal types. First, the HIPAA
statute, and thus the Security Rule, do not address trafficking in private
health information by businesses and individuals outside of the health
industry, such as employers, marketers, and lenders that are not "cov-
ered entities."32 Consequently, these parties are permitted to handle
health data without restriction under HIPAA.ss Second, although the
HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients to inspect and copy their PHI,34 it
does not enable individuals to establish the provenance of the data or
verify how the information has been used." Third, the HIPAA Security
Rule gives covered entities an excessive amount of discretion in decid-
ing what implementation specifications they will address and how they
will do so, and many of its standards and implementation specifications
lack sufficient detail and specificity. 36 As a result, careless or unscrupu-
lous covered entities are very likely to become the main source of illic-
itly obtained PHI. 57 Furthermore, well-meaning but resource-poor cov-
ered entities that cannot develop sophisticated expertise with respect to
computer security technology are given insufficient guidance as to how
to achieve compliance with the Security Rule." Fourth, the HIPAA pri-
vacy regulations, including the Security Rule, do not establish a private
cause of action for aggrieved individuals." Thus, insufficient enforce-
ment mechanisms significantly diminish the regulations' deterrence and
remedial powers.°
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes
the relevant Security Rule provisions.'" Part II critiques the Rule and
32 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3) (defining a "covered entity" as a "health plan," "health
care clearinghouse," or "health care provider who transmits any health information in
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter").
33 See id.
54 Id. § 164.524(a) (1) (establishing that an Individual has a right of access to inspect
and obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated
record set").
35 See id.
36 See 45 C.F.R. 164.306(b) (2006) (establishing that "[clovered entities may use any
security measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement
the standards and implementation specifications" of the Security Rule in a provision enti-
tled "Flexibility of approach").
31 See id.
See id.
" See id. §§ 160.300-.552; Peter k Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy
Rules and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 618 (2002).
4° See 45 C.F.R §§ 160.304-.552.
41 See infra notes 48-91 and accompanying text.
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exposes its weaknesses." To address the Security Rule's deficiencies,
this Article proposes in Part III a detailed set of recommendations for
enhancing PHI security. 43
 We acknowledge the challenge of crafting
static regulations for an area that is dynamic by nature because both
computer technology and security threats are continually changing. We
also recognize the potential tension between patients' needs for privacy
safeguards and businesses' needs for efficient and profitable opera-
tions. We have considered the implications of our proposal in a variety
of circumstances and have evaluated them through detailed examples.
Our recommendations include: (1) expanding the definition of
"covered entity" to include any person who knowingly stores or trans-
mits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for
any business purpose related to the substance of such information;44
(2) broadening the right of access to PHI so that affected individuals
can obtain information concerning its provenance and uses;" (3) revis-
ing several of the Security Rule's provisions to provide further detail
and guidance, and establishing mechanisms that will facilitate compli-
ance;46 and (4) adding a private cause of action to the law's enforce-
ment scheme. 47 Although we focus our critique on the Security Rule,
some of our recommendations, such as changes in statutory definitions
and scope, necessarily would extend to the Privacy Rule as a whole.
I. THE HIPAA SECURITY RULE
The HIPAA Security Rule establishes general security requirements
and provides implementers with . broad discretion in choosing appro-
priate technologies to implement the standards." One of the Rule's
guiding principles is "technological neutrality," an approach based on
the belief that regulators should not dictate the use of specific tech-
nologies, which may be inappropriate in particular settings or super-
seded by improved technologies." It is clear from the public comments
42 See infra notes 92-193 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 194-333 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 239-293 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 249-318 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 319-333 and accompanying text.
48 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302—.318 (2006); see also Health Insurance Reform: Security Stan-
dards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8336 (Feb. 20, 2003) (stating that the final Rule was written "to
frame the standards in terms that are as generic as possible and which, generally speaking,
may be met through various approaches or technologies").
See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8335 (describing
the drafters' "basic assumptions that the entities affected by this regulation are so varied in
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received by HHS to the initial proposed version of the Security Rule
that industry strongly favored such discretion. 50
A. HIPAA Security Requirements
The Security Rule establishes four general requirements. Covered
entities must: (1) ensure the "confidentiality, integrity, and availability"
of electronic health information that they produce, obtain, maintain,
or transmit; (2) protect the data against reasonably anticipated threats
to its security or integrity; (3) safeguard against impermissible use or
disclosure of the information; and (4) ensure that their employees com-
ply with the Rule 51 Covered entities may choose the means by which to
"reasonably and appropriately" implement the Rule's standards, so long
as they consider their size, complexity, capabilities, and technical infra-
structure in making their decisions along with the costs of implementa-
tion and the risks of security breaches. 52
The HIPAA Security Rule features "standards" and then "imple-
mentation specifications" that provide instructions concerning how to
fulfill the obligations outlined in the standards. There are two types of
implementation specifications: required and addressable. 53 Required
implementation specifications are mandatory.54 By contrast, implemen-
ters may respond to an addressable implementation specification in one
of three ways: (I) by implementing it, (2) by implementing an "equiva-
lent alternative measure," or (3) by doing neither because implementa-
tion would not be "reasonable and appropriate."55 A covered entity that
does not implement an addressable implementation specification must
document its justification for not doing so, 56 and all covered entities
terms of installed technology, size, resources, and relative risk, that it would be impossible
to dictate a specific solution or set of solutions that would be useable by all covered enti-
ties").
so hi. (stating that "lmiany commenters also supported the concept of technological
neutrality, which would afford them the flexibility to select appropriate technology solu-
tions and to adopt new technology over time"); see also id. at 8336 (explaining that numer-
ous commentators asserted that "the security standards should not be overly prescriptive
because the speed with which technology is evolving could make specific requirements
obsolete and might in fact deter technological progress").
51 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a). Permissible and impermissible uses of private health infor-
mation are described in Subpart E of the H1PAA Privacy Rule. Id. §§ 164.500—.534.	 •
52 Id. § 164.306(b).
55 Id. § 164.306(d).
54 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d) (2) (2006).
55 Id. § 164.306 (d) (3).
58 Id. § 164.306(d) (3) (ii) (B) (1).
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must review their compliance and modify their security measures as
needed. 57
1. Administrative Safeguards
Several required implementation specifications are intended to
provide administrative safeguards.58 These safeguards include risk analy-
sis and risk management practices, the establishment of sanctions for
noncompliant employees, and information system activity reviews."
Covered entities also must identify a "security official" who is responsible
for compliance with the Security Rule and establish procedures whereby
only authorized individuals have access to electronic PHI.6° To achieve
workforce security, a covered entity should implement authorization
and supervision standards, workforce clearance procedures, and termi-
nation of authorization procedures, but these are considered address-
able implementation specifications. 81
In addition, a covered entity should implement a security aware-
ness and training program for its workforce and implement measures
such as security reminders, mechanisms that protect against malicious
software, log-in monitoring, and password management." The Security
Rule mandates the creation of response and reporting mechanisms for
security incidents" and contingency plans that focus on data backup,
disaster recovery, emergency mode operation, testing and revision pro-
cedures, and analysis of the criticality of the affected data and applica-
tions." It also instructs that covered entities should perform periodic
evaluations of their compliance" and may enter into written contracts
or other arrangements with business associates to handle electronic
PHI, so long as the associates provide satisfactory assurances that they
will appropriately safeguard the data." The Security Rule, however,
does not apply to the transmission of electronic PHI to another health
57 Id. § 164.306(c).
" Id. § 164.308(a).
" 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (1) (ii).
su 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (2)—(3) (1) (2006).
51 Id. § 164.308(a) (3) (ii).
62 Id. § 164.308(a) (5). These are addressable implementation specifications. Id.
63 Id. § 164.308(a)(6).
64 Id. § 164.308(a) (7). The development of testing and revision procedures and appli-
cations and data criticality analysis are addressable implementation specifications. Id. The
other safeguards are required. Id.
55 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (8).
65 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b) (1), (3)—(4) (2006); see also id. § 164.314 (listing specifications
regarding business associate contracts and other arrangements).
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care provider who is treating the patient, a group health plan sponsor,
or agencies determining eligibility for government programs providing
public benefits.67
2. Physical Safeguards
The HIPAA Security Rule next establishes physical safeguards aimed
at thwarting unauthorized access to electronic information systems and
the facilities in which they are housed while ensuring access to author-
ized personnel.6 This subsection describes several "addressable" imple-
mentation specifications regarding contingency operations, facility secu-
rity plans, access control and validation procedures, and maintenance of
records concerning repairs and modifications to security-related compo-
nents of the physical plant 59
In addition to safeguarding workstation security," a covered entity
must establish procedures that govern the movement of hardware that
contains electronic PHI within and outside of the facility in question. 7 '
These procedures should address electronic media disposal, removal of
PHI in cases in which equipment will be reused for other purposes,
maintenance of records of the hardware's whereabouts and who is re-
sponsible foi it, and data backup and storage prior to moving equip-
men t. 72
3. Technical Safeguards
The required and addressable" technical safeguards detailed by
the HIPAA Security Rule are designed to ensure that only authorized
personnel have access to electronic PHI. 74 These safeguards include
assigning unique user identification names or numbers, establishing
emergency access procedures, having an automatic logoff after a spe-
cific period of inactivity, and implementing encryption and decryption
67 Id. §§ 164.308(b) (2), .502(e) (1) (ii) (C).
63 Id. g 164.310(a) (1).
69 Id. § 164.310(a)(2).
7° Id. § 164.310(b)—(c).
71 45 C.F.R. §164.310(d)(1).
72 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d) (2) (2006). The implementation specifications for disposal
and media reuse are required, while the record-keeping and data backup and storage re-
quirements are addressable. Id.
73 See infra notes 75-76 (indicating which safeguards are required and which are ad-
dressable).
74 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1).
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mechanisms." This provision also discusses audit controls, authentica-
tion mechanisms for electronic PHI and its users, and measures to en-
sure security when electronic PHI is transmitted electronically. 76
B. Enforcement
The HIPAA legislation authorizes both civil and criminal penal-
ties." Given that HHS is not authorized to conduct criminal prosecu-
tions, however, the privacy regulations only address the civil penalties."
Under a Final Rule issued by HHS on February 16, 2006, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule's enforcement provisions also are applicable to the Secu-
rity Rule." Thus, if a covered entity discloses health information in an
unauthorized manner for any reason, it can be penalized." In addition,
it can be penalized for the absence of appropriate security measures
even if no PHI is disclosed. 81
These provisions establish a primarily complaint-driven enforce-
ment scheme for privacy violations. 82 Persons" who believe that a cov-
ered entity is violating the Privacy Rule may submit a complaint to the
Secretary of HHS, who has discretion as to whether to investigate it. 84
The authority to administer and enforce the Security Rule has been
delegated to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"),
75 Id. § 164.312(a) (2). Unique user identification and emergency access procedures
are required, while automatic logoff and encryption and decryption mechanisms are ad-
dressable implementation specifications. Id.
76 Id. § 164.512(b)-(e). Mechanisms for information authentication and integrity con-
trols for the transmission of data are designated addressable. Id,
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to 1320d-41 (2000). The criminal penalty provision is discussed
further infra note 88 and accompanying text.
78 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.400-.426 (2006).
79 H1PAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb.
16, 2006) (stating that "Nile final rule amends the existing rules relating to investigation
of noncompliance" and the imposition of penalties "to make them apply to all of the HI-
PAA Administrative Simplification rules, rather than exclusively to the privacy standards");
see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.300 (making the enforcement provisions applicable to all 1-IIPAA
rules, including the Security Rule). Originally, the enforcement provisions applied only to
Subpart E of the Privacy Rule, which limits the circumstances under which covered entities
can use and disclose PHI. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-.534.
8° 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-.534.
81 Id. §§ 164.302-.318.
1-IIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,224, 20,226
(Apr. 18, 2005). The regulations, however, also provide that HHS may conduct compliance
reviews without receiving a complaint. 45 C.F.R. § 160.308; HIPAA Administrative Simplifi-
cation: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,226.
" A ''person" is defined as a "natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, pro-
fessional association or corporation, or other entity, public or private." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
m 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a), (c) (2006),
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and thus, CMS investigates alleged violations relating to the Security
Rule specifically. 85 If a covered entity is found to be noncompliant, it
will be informed by the Secretary, who will, if possible, attempt to re-
solve the matter informally. 86 The Secretary has authority to impose civil
penalties for noncompliance in an amount not to exceed $100 per vio-
lation, or $25,000 during a calendar year "for all violations of an identi-
cal requirement."87 In addition, violators may be subject to criminal
prosecution and fined up to $250,000 and may face imprisonment for
up to ten years. 88 A respondent may also request a hearing before an
administrative law judge (an "ALJ"). 89 As is typical in administrative
a5 Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegation of Authority Notice, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60,694, 60,694 (Oct. 23, 2003). On March 25, 2005, CMS issued a notice entitled
"Procedures for Non-Privacy Administrative Simplification Complaints Under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996," which became effective on April 25,
2005. 70 Fed. Reg. 15,329, 15,330-31 (Mar. 25, 2005). The notice states that if CMS finds a
violation based on a complaint, it will work with the covered entity "to obtain voluntary
compliance." Id. In the absence of cooperation, "the Secretary will pursue other options,
such as ... civil money penalties." Id. at 15,331.
" 45 C.F.R. § 160.312(a)(1).
67 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a) (1) (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 160.508. A civil penalty may not be
imposed for a violation if it is punishable as a criminal offense under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6,
which is administered by the Department of Justice. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(b)(1); HIPAA
Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,237.
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6. This provision, entitled "Wrongful disclosure of individually
identifiable health information," states:
(a) Offense
A person who knowingly and in violation of this part—
(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;
(2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an in-
dividual; or
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another per-
son, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Penalties
A person described in subsection (a) of this section shall—
(1) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than I year, or
both;
(2) if the offense is committed tinder false pretenses, be fined not more
than $100,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individu-
ally identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal gain,
or malicious harm, be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.
Id.
aa 45 C.F.R. § 160.504(a).
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proceedings, only limited discovery is permitted,9° and the AU is gen-
erally not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence."
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE SECURITY RULE
The HIPAA Security Rule is characterized by several flaws and de-
ficiencies that greatly detract from its efficacy. These relate to the nar-
row definition of "covered entity," the limited access individuals have to
information concerning their PHI, the Rule's insufficient compliance
guidelines, and the lack of a private cause of action for Privacy Rule
violations. This Part will analyze alI of these shortcomings.
A. Covered Entities
The HIPAA Security Rule follows its enabling legislation, the HI-
PAA statute, and covers only health plans, health care clearinghouses,
and health care providers that transmit health information electroni-
cally.92
 Consequently, doctors, hospitals, pharmacists, health insurers,
and health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") must comply with the
HIPAA privacy standards, but not all parties possessing PHI are cov-
ered." Thus, websites selling nonprescription medications or dispens-
ing medical advice," employers handling applicants' and employees'
medical records, marketers, or any other business entities that obtain
PHI are not bound by the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule. 95
The Rule's narrow scope of coverage compromises its ability to protect
Americans against misuse of their PHI. It leaves the vast amount of
health information stored on systems maintained by noncovered enti-
ties especially vulnerable to theft, destruction, or alteration. 96
In fact, it is arguable that the greatest PHI-related threats are asso-
ciated with the acquisition of PHI by non-health-care-related entities.
9° See 45 C.F.R. § 160.516 (2006).
91 Id. § 160.540.
92 Id. § 160.102(x).
93 SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 208; Whin, supra note 39, at 618 (affirming that the "Rules
do not subject to legal sanction any of the numerous entities whose access to personal
health information has exploded with the increased use of electronic health informa-
tion").
94 See PEw INTERNET & Ant LIFE PROJECT, supra note 31, at 6-8; David L. Balmer et al.,
Internet Privacy Law: A Comparison Between the United States and the European Union, 23 COM-
PUTERS & SECURITY 400, 410 (2004) (emphasizing that websites in the United States are
not regulated with respect to most transactions, including those involving health informa-
tion).
SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 208.
96 COMPUTER SC1. & TELECOMM, ED., supra note 18, at 3.
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Many commentators have expressed concern that disclosure of health
information can lead to loss of various types of insurance; employment
and educational discrimination; denial of loans; and severe disadvan-
tages in custody battles, adoption efforts, parole proceedings, and per-
sonal injury lawsuits." Blackmail, identity theft, and other crimes per-
petrated by those with access to illicitly obtained PHI are also grave
dangers.98
The European Union (the "E.U.") has tackled the contemporary
threat to privacy by non-health-care-related entities very aggressively.
The E.U. Privacy Directive provides wide-ranging privacy protection."
It binds "Member States"'" and extends to the processing of all per-
sonal data by any party, with few exceptions.m Specifically, the Direc-
tive's broad language establishes that "Member States shall prohibit the
processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership,
and the processing of data concerning health or sex life." 182 It then de-
lineates exceptions to the rule, which, in the case of health informa-
tion, relate to the provision of medical care.'"
By contrast, the United States has a much more segmented ap-
proach to privacy, though it has enacted numerous individual laws that
address privacy issues. The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, governs all
federal agencies.'" The law forbids the disclosure of personal informa-
tion (with some exceptions), aims to safeguard the security of records,
and allows individuals to review their records and request corrections
of errors. 1°8 Although the law covers only federal agencies, it is in some
ways much broader than the HIPAA Privacy Rule because it defines "re-
cord" to mean not only medical data, but also identifiable information
97 Janet L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 FIRooK. L. REV.
755, 764-65 (2001); Joanne L. 1 -Instead & Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 28 Am. IL,
& Men. 285, 288 (2002); Mark A. Rothstein Sc Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic
Medicine, and Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 887 (1999).
98 See supra notes 5-23 and accompanying text.
99 See generally Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter E.U. Privacy Directive].
199 Id. art. 1, 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 38.
101 Id. art. 3, 1 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 39. The exceptions include matters such as the
processing of information for security purposes or criminal law and processing "by a natu-
ral person in the course of a purely personal or household activity." Id.
r1)3 id art. 8, 1 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 40.
I" Id. art. 8, 11 2-3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 40-41.
104 5 U.S.C. fi 552a (2000).
195 Id. § 552a (b)—(e).
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about people's "education, financial transactions, medical history, and
criminal or employment history." 106
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is devoted to privacy.' 07 It
requires financial institutions to respect customers' privacy and shield
the security and confidentiality of customers' private infbrmation." 8 To
this end, the law prohibits financial institutions from disclosing "non-
public personal information" to a nonaffiliated third party if the disclo-
sure is not authorized by the lawm and requires regulatory agencies to
establish standards concerning appropriate "administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards" for private information.'"
A number of other laws also protect privacy in particular realms.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 governs the ac-
cessibility and disclosure of certain student records." The Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 mandates that cable operators inform
subscribers of any personal information that is collected, the disclosure
of such information, and the subscribers' right of access to the informa-
tion. 112 Information cannot be collected or disclosed without the cus-
tomer's written or electronic consent unless it is needed for a "legiti-
mate business activity.'" 5
 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
governs electronic surveillance and restricts searches and interception
of wire, oral, and electronic communications.'" The Video Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 1988 provides that video store operators may not disclose
the titles of the videos rented or purchased by any particular customer,
though some exceptions apply. 115
 The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994 requires states to obtain a driver's consent before divulging per-
sonal information contained in motor vehicle records to marketers,
unless one of the stated exceptions is applicable.'" The Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 establishes that operators of web-
106 See id. § 552a(4).
107 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000).
1°8 Id. § 6801(a).
wg Id. § 6802(a)—(b).
It° Id. § 6801(b).
111 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
112 47 U.S.C. §551(a)—(d) (2000 & Stipp. III 2003).
111 Id. § 551(b)—(c). The law further provides that cable operators may not disclose to
the government "records revealing cable subscriber selection of video programming from
a cable operator" and must destroy personally identifiable information when it is no
longer needed. Id. § 551(c) (2) (D), (e).
114
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2701 (2000).
110 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (3). (b) (1) (2000).
116 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000).
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sites targeted at children must acquire parental consent to use the per-
sonal data of children under the age of thirteen. 117
The laws discussed above provide varying degrees of privacy pro-
tection to individuals with respect to particular kinds of information or
particular holders of private information. 118 It is unlikely that the
United States will be willing to adopt a privacy law that is as far-reaching
as the E.U. Privacy Directive. In the spirit of already existing U.S. legis-
lation, however, we should have at the very least a law that narrowly tar-
gets only health information but is broad enough to include within its
scope all parties that maintain or transmit such information in elec-
tronic form for business reasons related to the substance of the PHI.
This approach already has been suggested in a bipartisan bill in-
troduced by Senator Hillary Clinton and then-Senator Bill Frist, enti-
tled the Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005. 119 The bill
was designed "Rio reduce healthcare costs, improve efficiency, and im-
prove healthcare quality through the development of a nationwide in-
teroperable health information technology system."'" The bill pro-
vided that the HIPAA privacy regulations be amended to "apply to any
health information stored or transmitted in an electronic format." 121 In
Part III of this Article, we similarly recommend that the term "covered
entity" in the HIPAA Privacy Rule be expanded to include any person
who stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic PHI for any
business purpose related to the substance of the PI-11. 122
B. Accessibility
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients access to their PHI. 123 Spe-
cifically, the regulations provide that "an individual has a right of access
to inspect and obtain a copy of protected health information about the
individual in a designated record set," with some exceptions, such as
psychotherapy notes and information compiled for purposes of litiga-
117 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(1), 6502 (2000).
118 For a critique of the privacy laws, see SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 67-72.
119 S. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Terry, supra note 13, at 138.
120 S. 1262, 109th Cong. pmbl.
121 Id. § 2907.
122 see
 i nfra
 notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
123 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2006).
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tion or administrative proceedings.'" Furthermore, the Privacy Rule
enables individuals to request amendment of PHI that is incorrect. 125
If the definition of "covered entity" is expanded to include any
person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable elec-
tronic PHI for any business purpose related to the substance of the
the right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of PHI should
extend to all electronic PHI that is processed by any covered entity. In
addition, the right to correct PHI should be similarly extended. Thus, if
an employer' 27
 or a bank obtains PHI in order to make employment or
loan decisions, the individual who is the subject of that information
should have a right of access to that data and a right to amend it if it is
incorrect.
Furthermore, the right of access should be expanded to include a
right to establish the provenance of the data and the purpose for which
it is used. This approach has been utilized by the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, which requires all consumer reporting agencies to disclose to con-
sumers, upon request, not only the information in the consumer's file,
but also "the sources of the information."'" In the case of health care
providers, health plans, and many health care clearinghouses, the ori-
gins and purposes of the data will be obvious from the documents
themselves, and thus, this requirement will add no burden to the cov-
ered entity. In the case of other parties, however, establishing the
provenance and uses of the information could be essential to determin-
ing whether the Security Rule has been breached by any covered entity,
by allowing the inappropriate dissemination of PHI. Information con,
cerning the data's origins also will be necessary to ascertain whether
criminal prosecution should be pursued, how widely the information
has been distributed, and how much harm might be done to the indi-
vidual at issue.
As discussed above, PHI is already commonly targeted by hack-
ers.'" It is not unrealistic to expect that a black market will develop for
PHI to which businesses, marketers, blackmailers, and others could
turn to purchase health information. According to one source, about
124 Id. § 164.524(a)(1).
125 Id. § 164.526(a). The provision also specifies the conditions under which a request
to amend records can be denied. Id.
125 See supra notes 92-122 and accompanying text.
127
 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000), for details
concerning the obligations of employers with respect to medical information.
128 15 U.S.C. 1681g(a) (1)—(2) (2000).
125 See supra notes 5-23 and accompanying text.
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$10 billion in U.S. medical transcription business is outsourced to for-
eign countries.'" Foreign data processors of PHI are "business associ-
ates" 1 " of covered entities, and are bound by certain privacy protection
requirements under the H1PAA regulations. 192 HEIS has admitted,
however, that it is unable to regulate effectively offshore business asso-
ciates or monitor their contracts with U.S. companies.'" It is entirely
possible that businesses or individuals processing PHI in distant loca-
tions, far from the direct reach of U.S. regulatory powers, will begin
selling PHI to third parties who believe it offers opportunities for
profit.
Several databases already sell lists of persons suffering from a large
number of ailments.'" In addition, health care information companies
sell individual physicians' prescribing records purchased from pharma-
cies to pharmaceutical companies that use them to market particular
drugs to specific doctors.'"
These lists are not necessarily compiled by illegal means. Rather,
medical and other personal data can often be mined from purchase
information, supermarket savings cards, surveys, sweepstakes and con-
test entries, U.S. Census records, credit card transactions, phone re-
cords, credit records, product warranty cards, or public records that are
rightfully in the possession of those aggregating the information.'"
Consequently, individuals are vulnerable to manipulation, exploitation,
and discrimination by those who have access to their PHI. The patients,
in turn, should, at the very least, be empowered to learn the origins
and uses of Nil possessed by various parties.
This disclosure approach is consistent with the one adopted by the
E.U. Privacy Directive)" The Directive provides that each data subject
15D Terry, supra note 13, at 164.
151 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2006) (defining "business associates").
152 Id. 164.504(e) (establishing standards for "business associate contracts"). The provi-
sion mandates that, with some exceptions, contracts between a covered entity and a business
associate "may not authorize the business associate to use or further disclose the information
in a manner that would violate the requirements of this subpart, if done by the covered en-
tity." Id.
155 Terry, supra note 13, at 165 (citing Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., to Edward J. Markey, Representative, U.S. House of Representa-
tives ( June 14, 2004)).
154 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Privacy and Consumer Profiling, iittp://wwwepic.org/
privacy/profiling (last visited Feb. 23, 2007); see, e.g., Hippo Direct, Medical and Healthcare
List, http://www.hippodirect.com/ListSubjectN_1.asp?1Subject-11 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007);
Med. Mktg. Servs., Inc., http://www.mnislists.org/privacy/profiling  (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
155 Steinbrook, supra note 16, at 2745.
1561
	
Privacy Info. Ctr., supra note 134.
157 See generally E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99.
350	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 48:331
may obtain "confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him arc
being processed and information at least as to the purposes of the proc-
essing," as well as the recipients, contents, and source of the data. 1  The
approach is also consistent with the Fair Information Practices (the
"FIP") outlined in a report issued by the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare in 1973. 139
 The HP provide, in relevant part:
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what informa-
tion about him is in a record and how it is used.
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him that was obtained For one purpose from being used or
made available for other purposes without his consent.
. • • •
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must ensure the reliability of
the data for their intended use and must take precautions to pre-
vent misuse of the data. 14°
Under these principles, data subjects have a right to know how their
PHI is used. They should also have a right to know the source of the in-
formation possessed by any party so that they can ensure that their in-
formation is not being misused or utilized for purposes for which it was
not intended. In Part III, Section B, we discuss mechanisms for allowing
meaningful inquiry concerning the origins and uses of electronically
stored PHI.
C. Insufficient Compliance Guidelines
The Security Rule leaves the mechanisms of implementing the out-
lined security standards to the discretion of the covered entity. 141 Al-
though flexibility is often a desirable quality, it can also be hazardous in
the regulatory context because it can leave those subject to regulation
without sufficient guidance as to how to comply with legal require-
138 E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99, art. 12(a), 1995 0j. (L 281) at 42.
139 See generally DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE.
RIGHTS OE CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY CostrorrrEE ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAE. DATA SYSTEMS (1973), available at http://aspehlis.gov/datacnc1/1973privacy/
tocprefacemetnhers.htm.
140 See generally id. The HP have not been codified into any specific law in the United
States, but rather, have served as the basis for some of the privacy laws discussed in this Ard-
cle. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Review of the Fair Information Principles: The Foun-
dation of Privacy Public Policy, http://wv,rw.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfohtm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2007).
141 45 C.F.R. § I64.306(b) (2006).
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ments.' 42 In the context of the Security Rule, it is unrealistic to expect
that every health care provider has the technical expertise and ability to
determine on its own how to implement the security standards.
Furthermore, some organizations could use the regulations' vague-
ness as a justification for establishing minimal PHI security measures. It
already appears that information technology is a low priority for the
health care industry. As of 2002, only two to three percent of the indus-
try's funding was devoted to the electronic management of PHI, com-
pared to ten to fifteen percent of funding devoted by other industries
to advance information technology. 145 Furthermore, the health care
industry is "generally considered to be ten to fifteen years behind other
industries with regard to security." 144
A careful reading of just a few of the Security Rule's provisions il-
lustrates its characteristic weaknesses. In a provision entitled "Flexibility
of approach," the Rule states, "Covered entities may use any security
measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately
implement the standards and implementation specifications." 145 The
regulations elaborate on the "reasonably and appropriately" standard
only by instructing covered entities to take into account the entity's
size, complexity, capabilities, and technical infrastructure; the security
measures' costs; and the "probability and criticality of potential risks to
electronic protected health information." 146 The above language does
not define the term "criticality" and fails to provide guidance concern-
ing how to identify "potential risks." 147
Likewise, in its "Administrative safeguards" section, the Security
Rule requires covered entities to lc] onduct an accurate and thorough
assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health informa-
tion:go No further details are provided concerning how the complex
task of risk analysis should be accomplished.
142 Choi et al., supra note 2, at 62 (characterizing the HIPAA privacy regulations as a
"loosely-worded document that is the current passing standard for privacy" and predicting
that covered entities will experience difficulty "interpreting exactly what HIPAA security
standards mean to their company and what exactly constitutes compliance").
141 Id,
144
 Nancy A. Lawson et al., The HIPAA Privacy Rule: An Overview of Compliance Initiatives
and Requirements, 70 . DFY. COUNS. J. 127, 147 (2003).
145 45 C.F.R. § 164,306(b) (1).
146 Id. § 164.306 (b) (2) .
142 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2) (2006).
148 Id. § 164.308(a) (1) (ii) (A).
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In response to comments received during the proposed Rule's pub-
lic comment period, HHS explained:
A thorough and accurate risk analysis would consider "all rele-
vant losses" that would be expected if the security measures
were not in place. "Relevant losses" would include losses caused
by unauthorized uses and disclosures and loss of data integrity
that would be expected to occur absent the security measures. 149
This description, however, also lacks sufficient specificity. For example,
whose losses are to be considered—those suffered by the data subjects,
by covered entities, 150
 by business associates, or by other stakeholders?
How direct or remote should the potential risks be in order to be con-
sidered? Unauthorized disclosure of PHI to various parties can affect
insurance coverage, job prospects, family dynamics, and even social op-
portunities.' 5 ' Should all of these potential consequences be contem-
plated?
If covered entities are to maintain discretion under the Security
Rule's flexible approach, 152 the key to ensuring that they choose effec-
tive security measures is a requirement that they implement rigorous
risk analysis and management processes. These processes should iden-
tify, analyze, and mitigate the particular risks associated with health in-
formation disclosure for various stakeholders, and especially for data
subjects. The Security Rule fails to provide sufficient guidance for the
development of such measures.
Besides exhibiting a low level of specificity in its security standards,
the Security Rule entirely fails to address certain important issues. The
Security Rule omits an explicit requirement that covered entities, per-
haps with the assistance of consultants or vendors,'" identify the rele-
vant best current security practices of the health informatics and computer
security communities. Such a requirement is needed to ensure that
covered entities are knowledgeable about sound security practices and
142 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8347 (Feb. 20,
2003).
155 In this response, HHS emphasized the potential losses that could be suffered by a
covered entity: "A covered entity that lacks adequate protections risks inadvertent disclo-
sure of patient data with resulting loss of public trust, and potential legal action." Id. at
8344. It is unclear why MIS did not focus on other parties that bear significant risks as
well.
151 See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
152 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(6) (1).
155 See infra notes 268-292 and accompanying text (discussing the services of security
product vendors).
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emergent security risks and their countermeasures. The rapid exploita-
tion of newly discovered vulnerabilities in software systems and applica-
tions by attackers makes it essential that covered entities be extremely
diligent in learning about and responding to vulnerabilities. Covered
entities or their agents should utilize the substantial amount of relevant
information that is provided by reputable organizations such as the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization ("ISO"), the Computer
Emergency Response Team ("CERT"), the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology ("NIST"), the National Information Assurance
Partnership ("NIAP"), and software vendors.'"
Another crucial omission from the Security Rule is guidance con-
cerning the risks inherent in the development, operation, and mainte-
nance of the computer software that provides the functionality of sys-
tems that process electronic PHI. Such software is often extremely
complex, comprising many thousands or millions of program instruc-
tions, most of which are executed only under particular conditions. Er-
rors in software development are virtually inevitable. Any software de-
fect, such as a missing or erroneous sequence of instructions, becomes
a security vulnerability if an attacker can exploit it to his or her benefit
and to the detriment of system stakeholders. Moreover, mistakes in the
configuration and operation of software easily can render it insecure, 155
as can errors made during software rnaintenance,156 the process of
modifying software to correct defects or to enhance its functionality.
Thus, covered entities should be required to consider the risks as-
sociated with software as part of their risk analysis process and to follow
best current practices for software development, validation, operation,
and maintenance. These risks include, among others: incorrect func-
tionality resulting in erroneous output, missing functionality, poor "us-
ability," poor documentation, "crashes" and other critical failures, and
excessive costs and delays in development leading to reduced emphasis
on product quality and security. 157 All of these risks can adversely affect
the security of electronic private health information.
154 See infra notes 269-318 and accompanying text.
155 SANS Inst., The Top 20 Most Critical Internet Security Vulnerabilities (Updated)—
The Experts Consensus, http://www.sans.org/top20/2005 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
15€ STEPHEN R. SCHACK, OBJECT-ORIENTED AND Cl.ASSICAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
7-13,479-96 (6th ed. 2005).
157 See id.; see also PETER G. NEUMANN, SRI INT'I., ILLUSTRATIVE RISKS TO THE PUBLIC
IN THE USE OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY (2007), available at ftp://
ftp.csl.sri.com/pub/users/neumann/illustrative.pdf.
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If compliance with the Security Rule's standards is not to be a
sham, the Rule's standards and implementation specifications must be
augmented, and covered entities must receive further guidance as to
how to achieve their obligations. Section C of Part HE develops recom-
mendations for elucidating the Security Rule's requirements and facili-
tating compliance through instruments that limit the costs and burdens
it places upon covered entities)"
D. Private Cause of Action
The HIPAA Security Rule does not provide for a private cause of
action)" Rather, enforcement is achieved through administrative pro-
cedures and hearings before an ALJ)" It is noteworthy that under the
Clinton Administration, the HHS Secretary's recommendations to
Congress included a proposal for a private right of action, but Congress
ultimately rejected this approach. 161
Under the enforcement system established by the regulations, any
aggrieved individual has a right to file a complaint with the HHS Secre-
tary) 62
 At his or her discretion, the Secretary may investigate the corn-
plaint) 63
 If a violation is found, the Secretary is to impose a penalty on
the offenderm and collect the money) 65
 but no damages are available
for persons who are aggrieved or injured by the privacy lapse. At the
request of the covered entity, a hearing may be held before an ALJ, but
the only parties to participate are the respondent and HHS personnel)"
By contrast to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, many other American pri-
vacy laws establish a private cause of action) 67
 These laws provide ex-
158
 See infra notes 244-318 and accompanying text.
159 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300–.552 (2006); Winn, supra note 39, at 618.
160 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300–.552; Winn, supra note 39, at 618.
161
 Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., Recommendations Pursuant to Section 264 of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Sept. 11, 1997), available
at http://www.aspe.hits.gov/adninsimp/pvcrec.htm
 ("Any individual whose rights under
the law have been violated, whether negligently or knowingly, should be permitted to
bring an action for actual damages and equitable relief. For knowing violation attorney's
fees and punitive damages also should be available.").
162 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a); see also U.S. Dep't of Health Sc Human Servs., Office for
Civil Rights—HIPAA, Medical Privacy—National Standards to Protect the Privacy of Per-
sonal Health Information, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa
 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (list-
ing information concerning the filing of complaints and other matters).
162 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(c).
164 Id
. § 160.402(a).
165 45 C.F.R. § 160.424(a) (2006).
166 Id. § 160.504(a).
167 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2000) (stating that individuals may bring
civil actions against noncompliant agencies for injunctive relief or for damages up to $1000
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plicitly for a right to recover attorney's fees and costs so that even plain-
tiffs with minimal damages resulting from inappropriate disclosure are
likely to find attorneys willing to litigate their cases. Like these laws, the
E.U. Privacy Directive supports the notion of private litigation and man-
dates that "Member States shall provide for the right of every person to
a judicial remedy for any breach'of the rights" embodied in the state's
applicable privacy law. 168
We recommend that the HIPAA Security Rule's enforcement pro-
visions, which apply to the entirety of the HIPAA privacy regulations, 169
be revised to include a private cause of action. Further details concern-
ing suggested procedures and remedies are discussed in Part 111. 170 At
this point, however, because covered entities surely would object to the
prospect of costly and onerous private litigation, it is appropriate to jus-
tify our recommendation and analyze the contributions a private cause
of action could make to PHI security.
If the HIPAA privacy regulations are intended to protect data sub-
jects, they must provide access to a remedy when individuals' rights are
violated and must not leave victims out of the enforcement process.
The HIPAA regulations provide little satisfaction for aggrieved persons
and discount their potential injuries by failing to include them in en-
forcement proceedings and provide them with a personal remedy.
Moreover, private litigation is often needed as an adjunct to ad-
ministrative procedures for deterrence purposes. Aggressive pursuit of
governmental enforcement actions may depend upon political priori-
in cases of intentional or willful violations, as well as attorney's fees and costs); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000) (stating that "any person whose wire,
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation
of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that
violation such relief as may be appropriate," including actual damages, punitive damages,
attorney's fees, and costs); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2000)
(allowing aggrieved persons to bring civil actions for actual damages, punitive damages, rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs, and equitable relief); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2000) (establishing that a "person who knowingly obtains, discloses
or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record" for an impermissible purpose will
he liable to the individual at issue for actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs, and equitable relief); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 551(0(1) (2000) (providing that "[a]ly person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in
violation of this section may bring a civil action" in a U.S. district court for actual damages,
punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs).
Ise E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99, art. 22, 1995 O J. (L 281) at 45.
159 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb.
16, 2006) (stating that the regulation's enforcement provisions now apply "to all of the
1IIPAA Administrative Simplification rules").
170 See infra notes 319-333 and accompanying text.
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ties and pressures, such as the degree to which a case is perceived as
advancing the general public interestt 7t or budgetary and other re-
source allocation constraints. 172 Thus, clear violations that affect only a
single person could be ignored, and cases that would not set important
precedents might not be litigated by the government no matter how
justified prosecution would be. Such inevitable resource-rationing deci-
sions can leave a significant deterrence void, which can only be filled
through private enforcement,
Private litigation features several important advantages over admin-
istrative proceedings. It can effectively restrict unlawful conduct through
the threat of costly and well-publicized court proceedings, and it can
often resolve cases more quickly than administrative enforcement han-
dled by overburdened agencies.lm Furthermore, careful judicial review
that produces published opinions can serve an important rule-making
function by setting precedents that interpret vague language in adminis-
trative regulations.'" Cases that capture media attention, as some law-
suits do, have the added advantage of educating members of the public
at large concerning their rights and obligations under the law. 175 By
contrast, although HIPAA mandates that ALis issue decisions containing
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the decisions are issued only to
the parties and are unlikely to be published in any widely accessible
format. 176
In fact, HHS already has been criticized for grossly deficient en-
forcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.'" Between April 14, 2003 and
June of 2006, HHS received 19,420 complaints concerning privacy vio-
171 See Arthur Best, Monetary Manages for False Advertising, 49 U. PITT, L. REV. 1, 40
(1987) (explaining that "[pi rivate suits do not have to pass a public interest test").
In See Ann J. Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: Issues in Implementation,
13 J. CORP. L. 65, 86 (1987) (stating that "reliance on public proceedings as the prime
means of enforcement is subject to the direct political restraints of budget resources and
indirect political pressures regarding how those resources are directed").
I" See Best, SU pro note 171, at 40.
174 See Gellis, supra note 172, at 81 (discussing judicial rule-making functions).
115 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.426 (2006). If the Secretary imposes a fine on a covered entity,
the Secretary is to notify the public "in such manner as the Secretary deems appropriate."
Id. The Secretary is given no instructions, however, as to which media outlets to utilize, and
it is uncertain whether a mere statement concerning the imposition of a penalty will gen-
erate the kind of extensive media interest that courtroom drama seems to produce.
176 See id. § 160.546(a), (c).
177 See Peter P. Swire, Justice Department Opinion Undermines Protection of Medical Privacy,
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, June 7, 2005, http://www.arnericanprogress.org/issues/2005/
06/b743281.11tml.
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lations. 178 No civil fine has been imposed,'" however, and as of June of
2006, only two criminal actions had been brought under HIPAA's
criminal enforcement provision.'" One case prosecuted a hospital
phlebotomist who accessed the medical records of a terminal cancer
patient in Seattle and obtained credit cards in his name, 181
 and the
other resulted in the conviction of a Texas woman who sold the medi-
cal records of an FBI agent.' 82
One might argue that several causes of action relating to privacy
violations already exist in tort law, rendering a statutory private cause of
action under HIPAA unnecessary. The tort of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts consists of four elements: (1) public disclosure, (2) of a pri-
vate fact, (3) that would be objectionable and offensive to a reasonable
person, and (4) that is not of legitimate public concern.'" Most courts
have found that to support this theory of liability, plaintiffs must prove
widespread dissemination of personal information to the publiclm and
have deemed this tort theory to fit mostly cases involving publication
throtigh the media.'" In the context of HIPAA violations, however, PHI
' 28 Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines: Lax Enforcement Puts Patients' Files at
Risk, Critics Say, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at Al. The regulations went into effect on April
14, 2003. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534.
178 Stein, supra note 178.
Id. The criminal enforcement provision is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000).
Swire, supra note 177. The defendant had charged over $9000 on the credit card
largely for video game purchases. Id. He pled guilty and was sentenced to sixteen months
in prison. Id.
182 Stein, supra note 178.
182 See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765, 767-68 (Ct. App. 1983) (not-
ing that jury found defendant liable for publicizing fact that plaintiff had gender correc-
tive surgery, but overturning award based on erroneous jury instructions). There are three
other kinds of invasion of privacy torts, none of which are likely to be relevant in the case
of PHI disclosures—intrusion on seclusion, appropriation of name/likeness, and placing
someone in a false light. See RESTATEMENT (SF.CONO) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
184 Winn, supra note 39, at 653; see Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F.
Supp. 1359, 1370 (D.S.C. 1985) (stating that "[Oommunication to a single individual or to
a small group of people" will not support liability under a theory of public disclosure of
private facts, which requires publicity rather than publication to a small group of people);
Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (emphasizing that publica-
tion to a small number of people will not create liability); Tollefson v. Price, 430 P.2d 990,
992 (Or. 1967) (stating that public disclosure occurs only when the information is com-
municated to the public generally or to a large nuniber of people); Vogel v. W. T. Grant
Co., 327 A.2t1 133, 137 (Pa. 1974) (explaining that the tort is established only if disclosure
is made to the public at large or the information is certain to become public knowledge);
Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131 (S.C. 1999) (stating that
"publicity, as opposed to mere publication, is what is required to give rise to a cause of
action for this branch of invasion of privacy").
188 SOTOVE, supra note 13, at 59-60 (explaining that this tort "appears to be designed
to redress excesses of the press").
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generally will be delivered to particular interested parties, such as drug
representatives, employers, or individuals with criminal intent, rather
than to the general public, and thus, the tort of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts will be inapplicable.
A more fruitful tort theory for plaintiffs might be breach of confi-
dentiality.' 86 Courts have based the patient's right of confidentiality
upon a variety of sources, including privilege statutes protecting physi-
cian-patient communications, licensing statutes prohibiting the disclo-
sure of patient information without authorization, and medical ethics
principles articulated in the Hippocratic Oath and other sources. 187 In
Horne v. Patton in 1973, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court held
that a physician breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing medi-
cal information to the patient's employer.'" The court ruled that a
doctor has a duty not to disclose patient information obtained in the
course of treatment and that a private cause of action exists in cases
where the duty is breached.'" An action for breach of confidentiality
can be maintained regardless of the degree to which the information
has been publicly distributed, and there is no requirement to prove the
intent of the perpetrator.'"
Nevertheless, in general, the tort of breach of confidentiality can
be established only when the perpetrator and the victim of the breach
of confidentiality had a direct relationship.m Plaintiffs have also occa-
sionally prevailed against third parties who knowingly induced physi-
cians to reveal confidential information in violation of physician-patient
confidentiality responsibilities, but here too, the improper disclosure
was made by the doctor. 192 In addition, because breach of confidential-
186 See Winn, supra note 39, at 652-58 (discussing the common law tort theory of
breach of confidentiality and its implications).
187 Id. at 654-55.
188 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (Ala. 1973).
189 Id.
190 Winn, supra note 39, at 657-58 (comparing the torts of invasion of privacy and
breach of confidentiality).
01 Id. at 662; see Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 527-28, 530, 536 (Or.
1985) (finding that a mother who had given her daughter up for adoption had a cause of
action for breach of confidentiality against a doctor who helped her daughter discover her
mother's identity and explaining that "only one who holds the information in confidence
can be charged with a breach of confidence").
199 Winn, supra note 39, at 661-65; see Hammonds v, Aetna Casualty Sc Surety Co., 243
F. Supp. 793, 795 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (suit brought against a physician's malpractice insurer
that had induced the physician to disclose the patient's confidential medical records when
no malpractice case was pending); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Mass. 1985)
(suit brought against individuals who obtained information from the plaintiff's psychiatrist
and used it to make an adverse employment decision); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715
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ity is a common law tort, the standard for establishing liability can vary
from state to state.'"
The breach of confidentiality tort, therefore, will not extend to
cases in which insurers or clearinghouses, rather than physicians or
hospitals, legitimately possess PHI and disclose it to third parties who
are not entitled to the data. Similarly, if the definition of "covered enti-
ties" is extended to encompass a large variety of parties in possession of
PHI, the breach of confidentiality tort will not apply to disclosures
made by employers, data miners, and others who obtained PI-II by
means other than physician disclosure.
Consequently, a statutory cause of action is needed to capture the
many privacy threats that do not fit within the narrow bounds of com-
mon law causes of action. A federal statutory cause of action with ex-
plicit guidelines regarding damages will diminish inequities and incon-
sistencies in case outcomes.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
In this Part, we provide four primary recommendations to enhance
the efficacy of the Security Rule in particular, and to some extent, the
Privacy Rule in general. These include: (1) expanding the scope of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule through revision of the definitions of "covered en-
tity" and "health information"; (2) enabling individuals to receive in-
formation concerning the provenance and uses of 'their PHI; (3) bol-
stering existing standards and implementation specifications, and pro-
viding covered entities with guidance and mechanisms that will facilitate
compliance with the Security Rule's requirements; and (4) establishing
a private cause of action for aggrieved individuals.'" Our recommenda-
tions are designed to create fixed regulations that are workable in the
dynamic and ever-changing realms of computer technology and security
vulnerabilities. They also seek to balance patients' needs for privacy pro-
tection against businesses' needs to operate efficiently and profitably.
We have carefully crafted our definitions to avoid creating unrealistic
burdens for those who cannot bear them. We also have considered the
N.E.2d 518, 520 (Ohio 1999) (involving a law firm that induced a hospital to allow it to
review all patient files to determine whether the patients were eligible for Supplemental
Security Insurance Disability benefits, and thus, presumably, might wish to utilize the law
firm's services); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 649-50 (W. Va. 1994)
(involving an employer who inappropriately obtained information from a physician who
treated the plaintiff for injuries for which he claimed workers' compensation).
1" See sources cited supra note 192.
194 See infra notes 195-333 and accompanying text.
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implications of our proposals in a variety of circumstances, which we
illustrate through detailed examples.
A. Expanding the Regulatory Scope
In order to expand the scope of the Privacy and Security Rules,
two regulatory definitions must be altered. The terms at issue are "cov-
ered entity" and "health information." This Section will formulate rec-
ommendations for revisions of the definitions, 195
 discuss the changes'
impact on the Privacy Rule's "uses and disclosures" provision, 196 and
critique alternative approaches to the suggested changes. 197
I. Covered Entities
Because health care providers, insurers, and clearinghouses are by
no means the only entities to maintain and transmit PHI, it is illogical
to limit the jurisdiction of the Security Rule in particular and the pri-
vacy regulations in general to these three types of entities. 198 The threat
to electronic PHI reaches far beyond the health care field because a
variety of parties, such as marketers, blackmailers, and anyone with a
stake in an individual's financial future, might be interested in obtain-
ing health information. 199
Consequently, the term "covered entity" in the HIPAA Privacy
Rulem should be expanded to include a fourth component, namely,
"any person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable
health information in electronic form for any business purpose related
to the substance of such information." At the same time, some of the
Privacy Rule's "Applicability" sections 201 and the "Applicability" provi-
sion of the HIPAA legislation itself292
 would need to be revised to add
the above-described fourth covered category.
The term "Person" is defined in the privacy regulations as "a natu-
ral person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional asso-
ciation or corporation, or other entity, public or private."2°3 The term
195 See infra notes 198-223 and accompanying text.
19° See infra notes 224-235 and accompanying text.
191 See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 92-121 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 5-23, 92-121 and accompanying text.
2°° See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) (providing the current definition).
201 Id. §§ 160.102, 164.104.
2°2 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a) (2000).
207 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
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"business" should be defined as an "activity or enterprise undertaken
for purposes of livelihood or profit."""
Admittedly, limiting the scope of regulatory coverage to those who
utilize PHI for business purposes related to the substance of the PHI
will result in the persistence of some significant security threats. For
example, volunteers associated with religious organizations might col-
lect and electronically store large volumes of information about com-
munity members who have been hospitalized or have disabilities for
purposes of providing them with assistance. If this data is not secured
through adequate computer technology and security practices, it could
be inadvertently or deliberately disseminated to unwanted sources. Yet,
this volunteer activity could not be defined as "business" under the
proposed revision and would not be addressed by the Privacy Rule.
Nevertheless, it is inadvisable to extend the regulations beyond this
suggested revision because doing so, ironically, could result in in-
creased governmental invasion of privacy rather than enhanced privacy
protection. To illustrate, a definition of "covered entity" that included
any person who handled electronic PHI for any reason whatsoever
would capture private citizens who e-mailed each other about a friend's
medical problem. These individuals would be required to purchase
costly security technology for their computers and be subject to penal-
ties for disseminating news of the illness to third parties without the
data subject's consent. Such a rule would constitute unwarranted gov-
ernment intrusion into purely private matters.
Application of the privacy regulations to volunteer activities also
would be undesirable because the cost of compliance and the threat of
liability might deter engagement in charitable work and, therefore,
hurt rather than promote the interests of those who are sick or have
disabilities. It also should be recalled that several relevant causes of ac-
tion exist under tort theories, such as public disclosure of private facts
and breach of confidentiality. 205 Thus, disclosures of private health in-
formation by parties not covered by the Privacy Rule's revised defini-
tion could, in appropriate circumstances, be addressed through tort
law, if they cause injury to the data subject. 206
Furthermore, limiting covered entities to those that knowingly
process individually identifiable health information in electronic form
for any business purpose related to the substance of such information
2°4 Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911) (providing similar definition);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 2004) (same).
205 See supra notes 183-193 a nd accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
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addresses the fact that some parties might unintentionally and inadver-
tently come to possess health information. For example, a photo shop
that develops pictures from digital cameras could handle pictures re-
vealing scars and physical impairments or memorializing hospitaliza-
tions, births, and other health-related events. These might be stored for
a time on the business's computer even though no employee specifi-
cally knows of their existence or uses them for any purpose relating to
health and medicine. It would be excessive and impolitic to burden all
photo shops with the requirements of the Security Rule and other pri-
vacy regulations based on the possibility that some of the pictures they
develop will contain medical data.
The final qualification of the definition, which restricts covered
entities to those that process PHI for any business purpose related to the
substance of such information, aims to exclude those who might come to
handle some form of PHI in the course of their business but who do
not actually use the contents of the information. Thus, the photo shop
described above would be excluded from coverage not only for the rea-
sons already discussed, but also because it does not utilize the contents
of health information concerning individuals for any business purpose.
To illustrate further, a small "mom and pop" store might sell over-
the-counter medications along with food and other items. If a customer
pays by credit card, these drugs might be scanned for payment pur-
poses and associated with the customer's credit card number in elec-
tronic transaction records. The store operators, however, would retain
the information only for purposes of credit card records and would not
utilize specific information concerning the customer's health-related
purchases for any business purpose. 207 It would be inappropriate to re-
quire the mom and pop store to comply with the H1PAA privacy regula-
tions' requirements based solely on its sale of pain relief or cold medi-
cations.
By contrast, pharmacies selling prescription drugs that are labeled
with the patient's name and doctor's instructions have kir more exten-
sive information about patients, including the names of their doctors,
histories of their prescription drug purchases, and other details, which
they utilize for purposes of refills and identifying repeat customers who
fill new prescriptions. Drug stores are thus justifiably covered entities. 208
207 If, however, the store operators wished to sell individually identifiable information
about the purchase of health products to third parties and thereby profit from its process-
ing, they would become covered entities.
408 SeeSoLovE, suirra note 13, at 208.
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Under the proposed definition, most if not all "business associates"
also will become covered entities because they are hired specifically to
process PHI.2® This coverage is consistent with the existing regulations,
which state that a "covered entity may be a business associate of another
covered entity" and will provide reinforced protection to data sub-
jects. 21° Business associates will not only be bound by the terms of their
contracts with other covered entities, which are governed by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 211 but also will be themselves subject to all of the Privacy
Rule's provisions, HHS investigations and administrative enforcement
actions,212 and private litigation in case of statutory violations.
2. Health Information
The recommended expansion of the definition of "covered entity"
will necessitate a parallel expansion of the meaning of "health informa-
tion," which is found in the privacy regulations' definition section 213 as
well as in HIPAA's statutory definition section. 214 "Health information"
currently means:
[A] ny information, whether oral or recorded in any form or
medium, that:
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health
plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or
university, or health care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual, the provision of health
care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment
for the provision of health care to an individual. 2 t5
This definition excludes PHI that is provided by individuals without
the involvement of a health professional and is handled by financial
2°9 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) (defining "business associate"); see also id. § 164.314
(stating contractual requirements relating to the processing of PI-11 by business associates).
Under the contractual terms demanded by 45 C.F.R. § 164.314, it would he very difficult
for a business associate to claim that it did not know it was processing PHI and thus escape
HIPAA responsibilities. To avoid any ambiguity, however, covered entities should state ex-
plicitly in their contracts that they are hiring business associates to process PHI.
210 See id. § 160.103.
211 Id. § 164.314 (articulating the standard for business associate contracts).
212 See id. §§ 160.500—.552. Unfortunately, business associates in foreign countries are
likely to be beyond the reach of HHS enforcement.
212 Id. § 160.103.
214 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2000).
215 Id.
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institutions, marketers, website operators, and many other parties with
an interest in individuals' electronic PHI. 216
A more appropriate definition can be derived from the proposed
Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, 217 discussed previ-
ously.216 This bill defines "health information" to mean "any informa-
tion, recorded in any form or medium, that relates to the past, present,
or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the
provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual." 219 This lan-
guage does not limit "health information" based on who its creator or
recipient was.
Although this definition is quite broad, it should be qualified to
require a clear association between data and the physical or mental
health status of a particular individual. Recall the above example of a
grocery store selling nonprescription medication, vitamins, or dietary
supplements. 22° Do records of purchases of such items constitute
"health information"? On the one hand, data miners may be able to
infer the existence of particular diseases from a series of seemingly un-
related purchases. 221 On the other hand, many substances can be util-
ized for a broad spectrum of conditions, ranging from a headache to
post-surgical care, and many items are bought for use by persons other
than the purchaser. The fact of the sale does not clearly reveal specific
information concerning a particular individual's health status. Conse-
quently, records of sales of nonprescription health-related goods should
not be covered by HIPAA even if they are maintained in electronic
form. We therefore recommend that "health information" be de-
lined as "any information, recorded in any form or medium, that
clearly relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health
or condition of an individual, the provision of healthcare to an individ-
ual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health-
care to an individual"
Because we cannot anticipate every circumstance that will arise
and require interpretation of the regulatory standards, we cannot pro-
216 See id.
217 SeeS. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005).
218 See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
"4 S. 1262 § 2901(3).
220 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
221 Buying a combination of high calorie dietary supplements, pain medication, and
particular vitamins could indicate that an individual has AIDS or cancer.
222
 PHI that is inferred by data miners from such records and used for business pur-
poses would, however, be covered under our definition.
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vide comprehensive guidance concerning the meaning of "health in-
formation" in every hypothetical instance. Further elucidation of the
Privacy Rule's requirements will be achieved over time through further
guidance by HHS and the courts in response to specific controver-
sies.223
3. Uses and Disclosures
The new definition of "covered entity" would render all of the pri-
vacy regulations' provisions applicable to anyone who knowingly trans-
mits or maintains electronic PHI for any business purpose related to
the substance of the PHI. A particularly significant section of the Pri-
vacy Rule is the "uses and disclosures" provision, 224 which prohibits the
utilization and dissemination of PHI without the patient's consent ex-
cept in specific circumstances that generally relate to medical treatment
or obligations established by law. 225 With an expanded definition of
"covered entity," this provision would have a dramatically greater im-
pact because it would constrain many more parties handling PHI. This
consequence is a salutary development that will provide much more
meaningful protection for individually identifiable health information.
Employers, life insurers, marketers, retailers, and others could not use
PHI or disclose it to third parties without obtaining the consent of the
data subjects.
The required contents of covered entities' notice of privacy prac-
tices, including use and disclosures, are specified in the federal regula-
tions.226 The regulations also require that each authorization be signed
and dated by the data subject.227 The regulations, however, do not in-
struct covered entities to alert data subjects that a risk of unauthorized
disclosure will exist no matter what security measures are implemented.
Because awareness of the risk could be essential to individuals' decision
making and provision of meaningful consent, we recommend that the
regulatory notice provision be amended to require that covered entities
include a statement in their patient consent forms such as, "despite our
efforts to safeguard your privacy, a risk remains that your electronically
stored PHI will be disclosed without authorization because of an unan-
223 See infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text (discussing means of contacting
HI-IS).
224 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2006).
225 Id. §§ 164.502(a), .512.
225 Id. § 164.520(14.
227 Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(vi).
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ticipated security failure."228
 Individuals who sign an authorization con-
taining this statement will be empowered to conduct their own risk
analysis and to make a more educated decision about consent.
The expanded prohibition will adversely affect marketing229 and
data mining operations, but it will not eradicate them. Covered entities
that wish to sell PHI would have to obtain consent from those whose
data is disclosed,23° but this may willingly be given if the request is care-
fully worded. For example, many individuals might provide authoriza-
tion if they are told that their information "will be used to identify
products that will better fit your needs." Data miners that garner in-
formation from sources other than the person to which it relates would
likewise need to obtain consent for every sale of their lists. To simplify
matters, a "do not market list," similar to the "national do not call list"
that relates to phone solicitations, could be constructed.
The Privacy Rule details numerous exceptions to the use and disclo-
sure prohibition, all of which would apply to the newly covered enti-
ties.231 These exemptions include, among others, uses and disclosures
without consent that are: (1) required by law; (2) necessary for public
health activities; (3) related to victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic vio-
lence; (4) required for purposes of health oversight activities; (5) ne-
cessary for judicial and administrative proceedings; (6) required for
law enforcement purposes; (7) necessary to avert a serious threat to
health or safety; or (8) needed for specialized government functions. 232
22 Unfortunately, covered entities will not be able to quantify the risk, such as by stat-
ing that the risk is one in a hundred or a thousand.
229
	 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (3) (establishing that covered entities must obtain con-
sent for any use or disclosure of 11-11 for marketing purposes with very limited exceptions).
230 Cf. Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Concerning the Processing of
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector,
2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 41-42 (stating that "Jiff the party collecting the data from the sub-
scriber or any third party to whom the data have been transmitted wishes to use the data
for an additional purpose, the renewed consent of the subscriber is to be obtained" and
that "When electronic contact details are obtained, the customer should be informed
about their further use for direct marketing in a clear and distinct manner, and be given
the opportunity to refuse such usage").
431
 See 45 C.F.R..§§ 164.502, .512 (2006) (detailing currently permitted uses and disclo-
sures).
232 Id. § 164.512. By comparison, the E.U. Privacy Directive, which applies to all entities
processing numerous categories of data, allows the processing of private information under
the following circumstances: (1) the data subject has consented to the processing; (2) proc-
essing is necessary for purposes of employment law; (3) the data subject is unable to provide
authorization and processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the individual in
question or a third party; (4) processing is done by a foundation, association, or other non-
profit-seeking body for its own purposes, and no data is disclosed to third parties without
consent; (5) the data is made public by its subject or is necessary for purposes of a legal
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It is possible that the expansion of the "covered entities" definition
will necessitate other unanticipated exceptions. These may be identi-
fied through public input provided during the notice and comment
period that would follow the proposal of the amendments delineated
in this Article.235
In addition, the NHS website establishes an avenue for commu-
nicating with the agency concerning comments and questions. 234 Spe-
cifically, it provides:
[Y]ou may submit an e-mail by clicking on the mailbox
(OCRPrivacy@hhs.gov). Individual responses will not be pro-
vided, however, we will address concerns of general interest
through development of new FAQs or other guidance for in-
clusion on our web site. As an alternative, you may call the
HIPAA toll-free number at (866) 6274748. 235
Thus, inquiries could be submitted to HHS concerning the permissibil-
ity of particular uses and disclosures, whether certain data constitutes
"health information," and other matters requiring clarification.
4. Alternatives to Revising the Privacy Rule
An alternative approach to modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule
would be to amend individually a large number of laws that govern
actors who might pose a threat to medical privacy. For example, the
Americans with Disabilities Act places boundaries upon the timing,
content, and use of employer-conducted medical inquiries and ex-
aminations. 236 It does not, however, address the permissibility of ac-
quiring medical data from third parties or the security measures that
must be applied to any health records possessed by employers. 237 This
claim; or (6) processing is required for medical reasons. E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99,
art 8, 1995 0j. (L 281) at 40; see also Andrew Charlesworth, Implementing the European Union
Data Protection Directive 1995 in UK Law: The Data Protection Act 1998, 16 Gov't' INFO. Q. 203,
215-18 (1999) (discussing the United Kingdom Data Protection Act of 1998 and the uses
and disclosures permitted by the law); Theo fIooghiernstra, The Implementation of Directive
95/46/EC in the Netherlands, with Special Regard to Medical Data, 9 EuR. J. HEALTH L. 219, 219-
21 (2002) (discussing the Netherlands's Personal Data Protection Act and its exceptions).
253 See 5 U.S.C. i3 553(b)—(c) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirement%
for proposed administrative rules).
234 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/contact.litml (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
335 Id.
236 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000).
237 Id.
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provision could be revised to indicate explicitly that it is impermissi-
ble for employers to use health information obtained from external
sources without the informed consent of the individuals in question
and to address the security of electronic medical data. As a second
example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions
to safeguard the confidentiality of their customers' nonpublic per-
sonal information but allows for its disclosure in a variety of circum-
stances. 238
 This law too could be tightened to establish a more rigid
prohibition of PHI disclosure and to instruct financial institutions to
employ appropriate security safeguards for computerized PHI.
Nevertheless, a piecemeal approach to enhancing PHI protection is
undesirable. First, from a practical standpoint, legislatures are unlikely
to revisit numerous statutes in order to address PHI issues. Second, the
process of revising multiple laws to include detailed security mandates
would be extremely cumbersome. Finally, a statute-by-statute approach is
likely to lead to inconsistencies in levels of protection furnished by dif-
ferent laws and to the introduction of new ambiguities in statutory lan-
guage that will require judicial interpretation. By contrast, a revision of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule will comprehensively repair the law. Broadening
the definitions of "covered entity" and "health information" will signifi-
cantly augment the efficacy of the HIPAA Security Rule in particular
and the Privacy Rule in general and will address many additional threats
to health information privacy.
B. Allowing for Meaningful Inquiry Regarding the Origins and Uses of PHI
As explained above, the HIPAA privacy regulations allow patients
to inspect and obtain copies of their PHI from covered entities. 239 So
long as the only entities covered by HIPAA are health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care providers, the origins and uses of the
documents generally should be obvious from the documents them-
selves and the party from which they were obtained. However, if the
privacy regulations are expanded, as we recommend, to cover any per-
son who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable health
information in electronic form for any business purpose related to the
substance of such information, it will become important for individuals
238 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6802 (2000). For example, the statute permits disclosure "to a
nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial
institution, including marketing of the financial institution's own products or services
...." Id. § 6802(b)(2).
2"v
	 C.F.R. § 164.524(a) (1) (2006).
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to be able not only to have access to PHI that is possessed by others, but
also to establish the provenance of the data and the manner in which it
has been used. This evidence will be vital for determining both the ex-
tent of the injury to the individual and the existence of Privacy Rule
breaches by data sources.
The requirement of informed consent for the use or dissemina-
tion of PHI should allow individuals to remain educated concerning
the movement of their PHI in most cases. 240 A party that wishes to
transmit PHI would need to obtain authorization from the affected in-
dividuals. The right of inquiry described above, however, will provide
an added information resource in cases in which data is obtained acci-
dentally, through the black market, or by other unlawful means.
The right of inquiry also will serve as a deterrent to malfeasance. If
a covered entity obtains PHI from a dubious source and then seeks au-
thorization to use it, the data subject is likely to be surprised by the re-
quest for consent and to inquire about the origins of the data. An un-
satisfactory response likely would lead the data subject to refuse to au-
thorize data use and thus, the purchaser will have wasted its effort and
money in obtaining the PHI. Furthermore, the data subject may file a
complaint with the government and/or initiate litigation against the
source that distributed the PHI in violation of the regulations. The ex-
panded right of inquiry should, consequently, incentivize covered enti-
ties to engage in due diligence to determine the legitimacy of PHI sup-
pliers. Because it provides data subjects with an inexpensive means of
conducting preliminary investigations concerning potentially inappro-
priate PHI disclosures, this mechanism should also deter regulatory
violations.
The privacy regulations allow covered entities to charge a "reason-
able, cost-based fee" for the copying, postage, and labor costs associated
with providing individuals access to their PHI. 241 Additional payments
could be required for processing of inquiries about the provenance
and use of PHI. These charges should prevent frivolous inquiries and
harassment of covered entities by the public.242
The process of inquiry should not be excessively burdensome for
covered entities and could be easily automated. Those processing PHI
should establish websites to which individuals can submit queries con-
cerning whether the entity possesses their PHI, and, if so, where it origi-
240 see id. § 164.508(a) (discussing the requirement that covered entities obtain authori-
zation for the use and disclosure of Pitt); supra notes 224-235 and accompanying text.
241 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c) (4).
242 See Id.
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nated and how it has been used. Generally, respondents will' be able to
develop boilerplate answers to diminish the need for individually de-
signed narratives. For example, common responses might be "obtained
from Hippo Direct list"243 and "used for marketing purposes."
C. Enhancing Compliance Guidelines
The Security Rule provides a dearth of specific instructions for
regulatory compliance, preferring to assume good judgment on the
part of covered entities. 2" This approach leaves a vacuum of guidance
for health care providers with no technological expertise. 245 It also
could encourage malfeasance by prosperous covered entities that could
invest significant resources in ensuring the security of electronic PHI,
but that instead choose to take minimal precautions. 246 We recommend
that a number of steps be taken to provide more specific guidance to
covered entities.
1. Augmenting the Implementation Specifications
The HIPAA Security Rule offers skeletal and vague implementa-
tion specifications that leave many substantial gaps and loopholes. Con-
sequently, a more robust scheme of standards and implementation
specifications would significantly advance the goal of improved security
protection for PRI. 247
First, a clarification should be made to the phrase "criticality of po-
tential risks" in the Security Rule's "flexibility of approach" provisions 2"
and the "risk analysis" requirement in the administrative safeguards'
implementation specifications. 249
 It should he clarified to indicate that
243 See Hippo Direct, ,supra note 134.
244 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (1) (stating that "[ciovered entities may use any security
measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement the
standards and implementation specifications as specified in this subpart"); supra notes
141-157 and accompanying text. Covered entities arc instructed to consider several factors
in making their implementation decisions, including their size, complexity, capabilities,
and technical infrastructure; the costs of the security measures; and the nature of the po-
tential threats to the Pitt they maintain, but they are given no assistance in making specific
implementation decisions. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2),
245 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (1) (2006).
248 See id.
247
 See supra notes 141-157 and accompanying text (critiquing the Security Rule's
flexible approach and vague guidance).
242
 45 G.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2) (iv).
242 Id. § 164.308(a) ( I ) (ii) (A); see supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text (critiqu-
ing these provisions of the Security Rule).
2007]	 Protecting Electronic Private Health Information 	 371
the risks to be considered are the risks to all stakeholders, including
data subjects, covered entities, and business associates.
Second, because effective risk analysis is crucial to a covered entity's
ability to choose appropriate security measures, the Rule must provide
further guidance as to how risk analysis should be conducted. 250 A sim-
ple way to do so would be to require covered entities to follow the NIST
Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems. 251 HE-IS cited the
NIST document as authority in its response to comments provided dur-
ing the proposed Security Rule's public comment period,252
 but the
Security Rule itself has no reference to it. We recommend that the
regulations' risk analysis provision 255 be amended to require that cov-
ered entities' risk analyses be consistent with all relevant guidelines es-
tablished in the NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems. If MIS determines at a later time that a better document exists
because the NIST guidance has become outdated or a superior docu-
ment is issued by a different organization, the regulatory provision
would need to be changed again to refer to the new source. 254
Covered entities that cannot implement this guidance themselves
for lack of expertise or resources could hire vendors to conduct the
risk analysis for them or provide them with a simplified form of the
risk analysis procedure that is tailored to their type of entity. Vendors
that specialize in electronic PHI security will be able to adapt the
NEST guidance to particular categories of businesses that they service
and may be able to accomplish the task by asking clients to fill out a
relatively short questionnaire that will provide all necessary informa-
tion. The use of vendors for HIPAA compliance purposes is discussed
in the next subsection of this Article. 255
280
	 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(1) (allowing covered entities discretion to choose ap-
propriate security measures).
251 See generally GARY S'FONEBURNER ET AL, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., RISK
MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR INFORMATION ThCHNOLOGY SYSTEMS (2002), available at http://csrc.
nist.pv/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf.
252 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8346 (Feb. 20, 2003).
z" 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (1) (ii) (A) (2006).
254 A draft international standard, ISO/DIS 27799, entitled "Health Informatics—Security
Management in Health Using ISO/IEC 17799," contains a thorough discussion of threats to
the security of health information. See Int'l Org. for Standardization, ISO/DIS 27799, http://
wwwiso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?GSNUMBER=412988:scopelist=
PROGRAMME (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). If this standard is passed and the risk assessment
section remains intact, the regulations may need to make reference to ISO 27799 as well, be-
cause, unlike the MST guidance, it is specific to the health information context.
255
 See infra notes 269-292 and accompanying text.
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Third, the Security Rule must induce covered entities to imple-
ment the best current practices of the health informatics and computer
security communities. 256 To that end, the "general requirements" sec-
tion 257 should include an additional element, placed before the current
fourth requirement, worded as follows: "Make reasonable efforts to
identify and employ best practices relating to security measures, soft-
ware development, validation, maintenance, and software system ad-
ministration that are either commonly used by similarly situated busi-
ness entities and governmental institutions or can be clearly demon-
strated to be superior to best common practices." 255 The best current
practices requirement would apply to all standards and implementation
specifications. Thus, if a covered entity determined that it would not be
"reasonable and appropriate" to implement an addressable implemen-
tation specification, it would need to document why implementing the
specification would not constitute best current practices under the cir-
cumstances. 259
The best current practices standard is essential to making the Se-
curity Rule meaningful in light of the dynamic nature of the computer
security field. The text of the Security Rule must maintain a level of
generality and cannot dictate that covered entities adopt specific tech-
nologies because these could easily become outdated even before the
regulations are enacted. A "best practices" standard is an effective way
to provide some guidance while maintaining sensitivity to the computer
technology environment. This approach is not unprecedented, given
that "best practices" standards are found elsewhere in U.S. law. For ex-
ample, a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that requires the estab-
lishment of effective compliance and ethics programs allows small or-
ganizations to model their programs partly on the "best practices of
other similar organizations."26° Likewise, an Environmental Protection
Agency regulation relating to hazardous air pollutants instructs covered
entities to design startup, shutdown, and malfunction plans that "reflect
the best practices now in use by the industry to minimize emissions.' 261
As discussed below, many if not most covered entities are expected
to utilize vendors to serve their HIPAA Security Rule compliance
256 See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
257 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a).
256 See id.
259 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d) (3) (i), (d) (3) (ii) (8) (1) (2006).
260 U.S. SENTENCING GuIDE1.11siES MANUAL § 882.1, ant. n.2(C) (iii) (2005).
261
 40 C.F.R. § 63.2852.
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needs,262 and thus, they will not themselves need to engage in the work
of determining industry standards. Moreover, a plethora of informa-
tion about security standards and industry practices is readily available
through the Internet and in print, published by reputable organiza-
tions such as ISO, CERT, MST, and NIAP, as well as software vendors. 268
Both vendors and covered entities should easily be able to access these
sources, from which best current practices can be ascertained. Al-
though covered entities can rely on a reading of industry literature to
determine best practices, they should not depend upon one single
source, given that no comprehensive guidance has been produced to
cover all aspects of HIPAA Security Rule compliance. Different docu-
ments will be relevant to risk analysis, security vulnerabilities, software
engineering, system administration, and so on. 2"
Fourth, the Security Rule, which currently fails to address software
engineering, should include language that explicitly focuses on this
essential security component. The best practices provision described
above, which would require covered entities to make reasonable efforts
to identify and employ best practices relating to software development,
validation, maintenance, and systems administration, is one step in the
right direction. 265 Furthermore, the risk analysis provision should in-
corporate an additional statement that the risks to be considered in-
clude those associated with software development, operation, and
maintenance.2" Similarly, the risk management provision should be
elucidated to state that the risks and vulnerabilities at issue include
those linked to software development, operation, and maintenance. 267
2. Security Product Vendors and Certification
The previous subsection recommended a "best current practices"
standard as a general Security Rule requirement. 268 The question to
which we now turn is how "best practices" should be identified and im-
plemented by covered entities.
One option is for CMS, in its oversight capacity, to create a central-
ized repository of information. CMS could maintain a website in which
it describes the security measures and technology needed by different
262
	 infra notes 269-292 and accompanying text.
an See infra notes 293-318 and accompanying text.
/64 See infra notes 293-318 and accompanying text.
265 See Supra notes 256-261 and accompanying text.
266 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (ii ) (A) (2006).
267 See id. §164.308(a) (ii) (B).
268 See supra notes 256-261 and accompanying text.
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entities for compliance purposes, provides a current list of known secu-
rity vulnerabilities in health information systems and the computing
platforms they rely upon, and designates the updates and fixes that are
sufficient to address these problems.
This approach, however, may run afoul of the notice and comment
requirements established by the Administrative Procedure Act. 269 A
binding set of technical requirements could be interpreted to consti-
tute rule making, which would trigger public notice and comment re-
quirements. 27° These, in turn, would generate significant delays and
render it impossible for CMS to respond to rapidly changing technol-
ogy and emerging security threats in a timely fashion. The Act estab-
lishes an exception for cases in which an "agency for good cause finds
(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons there-
fore in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."211 It is
possible but not certain that this exception would apply to the above-
described website.
Several other problems are inherent in the centralized repository
approach. CMS would require significant additional funding and per-
sonnel resources to produce and continuously update a comprehensive
set of materials for the website, and it would need to develop technical
expertise that it does not currently have. Furthermore, relying on a sin-
gle source of information means that any mistakes or flaws in the in-
formation could affect all covered entities. Finally, if the government
retains power to designate best current practices, covered entities' se-
curity obligations might vacillate significantly with changes in the po-
litical environment. Thus, some administrations might articulate very
demanding standards and others very lax ones.
A superior alternative would be to allow best current practices to
emerge through the free market. Presumably, members of the com-
puter security industry would compete to produce the best possible
products at a reasonable cost. As a check against market flaws that gen-
erate low standards within private industry, covered entities also would
be instructed to research, as part of their best practices analysis, the
computer security measures that are adopted by the government. 272
269 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)—(c) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements
for proposed administrative rules).
27° See id.
271 Id. § 553 (b) ( 3 ) (B).
272 See supra notes 256-261 and accompanying text (explaining that best practices are
those commonly used by industry and governmental institutions).
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Many covered entities will lack the technical knowledge and re-
sources to identify best current practices and achieve Security Rule
compliance and will require the services of computer security profes-
sionals. To that end, it would be useful for CMS to maintain on its web-
site a list of approved vendors that can be retained by covered entities
for purposes of achieving Security Rule compliance. The vendors
would provide both products and technical assistance and would need
to have not only technical expertise but also thorough familiarity with
the H[PAA Security Rule. The vendors would be certified based on
proof that their technology is state-of-the-art and Security Rule compli-
ant, that they have not been negligently responsible for any Security
Rule breaches, and that they are able to address critical new security
threats through timely user advisories, software improvements, and
automatic installation of software updates.2" Vendors would also have
to be certified for entities of particular sizes and types, because differ-
ent business environments require different services.
Covered entities that retain the certified vendors would be pre-
sumed to have complied with the Security Rule's requirements, though
the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that they failed to fol-
low the vendor's instructions or refused to accept the vendor's recom-
mendations. It also could be rebutted with evidence that the covered
entity knew or should have known that the vendor was not actually pro-
viding products and services that were Security Rule compliant. 274 This
would occur in instances in which a vendor had been exposed by a
whistleblower or the media as engaging in quackery or the sale of inef-
fective products. The rebuttable presumption would provide protection
against under-scrutiny by the government during the certification
process and against vendors that might act in bad faith after they are
certified in order to under-sell competitors or enjoy greater profits.
Where appropriate, the vendors should provide clients with alter-
natives from which they can select, depending on their resources and
capabilities. For example, covered entities that are experiencing finan-
cial difficulties could be given the option of de-identifying all of their
2" The government licenses and recertifies individuals and entities in other contexts.
For example, attorneys must pass the bar in order to practice law and, in many states, must
earn a certain amount of CLE credit each year to retain their licenses. Similarly, nursing
homes are certified and periodically surveyed for purposes of recertification. See Senator
Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Reform: A Historical Account of the Recent
Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-Term Care Facilities Established in the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1 98 7, 7 ELDER U. 267,271-72 (1999).
"4 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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electronic PHI. This would entail associating a new, automatically gen-
erated identifier, such as a random number, with a patient's electronic
health record. A list mapping these identifiers to patients' names
and/or Social Security numbers would be maintained only in paper
form. This approach would constitute an inexpensive and simple alter-
native to implementing sophisticated, technological security measures.
Furthermore, to achieve Security Rule compliance, covered enti-
ties should have ongoing relationships with vendors so that vendors can
provide software updates as the need arises and reassess entities every
year or two to ensure that they continue to employ current and appro-
priate security practices. 275 Covered entities that do not hire one of the
approved vendors will be responsible for developing their own imple-
mentation measures, which must be at least as effective as those pro-
vided by certified vendors.
Proposals for certification by CMS were discussed in the comments
to the proposed Security Rule.276
 CMS asserted that it did not intend to
establish certification criteria for covered entities because it did not
"have the resources to address the large number of different business
environments."2" Similarly, CMS refused to "assume the task of certify-
ing software and off-the-shelf products" for lack of resources and exper-
tise.278
 Instead, CMS believed that compliance assessment instruments
should be developed and implemented by the private rnarketplace. 279
Certification of vendors, rather than covered entities or products,
was not discussed in the comments. 28° This type of certification may be
less burdensome for CMS, because there should be fewer vendors than
covered entities or products. It is likely, however, that CMS still would
argue that it lacks sufficient resources and expertise to certify even
vendors alone.
Nevertheless, CMS should reconsider its unwillingness to provide
some form of certification for compliance purposes. Several comments
to the proposed Security Rule emphasized the need for a list of feder-
ally approved security products and for certification procedures. 281 This
need is acute for small covered entities that do not have the funds, per-
2" The reassessment might be easily achieved through a well-tailored questionnaire.
276 See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8352 (Feb. 20,
2003).
277 Id.
278 Id.
"8 Id.
288
 Id. at 8351-52.
281 See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8352.
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sonnel, and computer proficiency to assess their Security Rule compli-
ance or to determine which commercially available security products
they should purchase in order to fulfill regulatory requirements. With
vendor certification, resource-poor covered entities would have an ac-
cessible and reliable mechanism to achieve compliance.
CMS acknowledged that other governmental entities are adopting
the certification approach.282 For example, NIST and the National Se-
curity Agency (the "NSA") have established the National Information
Assurance Partnership, whose goal is to help information technology
producers and consumers meet their security testing and assessment
needs. 288 To that end, the NSA has established the TEMPEST284 En-
dorsement Program, through which it provides lists of TEMPEST tele-
communications equipment, TEMPEST test services facilities, and
Commercial Off-the-Shelf telecommunications equipment that it has
endorsed.285 Germany has embraced certification to a much larger ex-
tent. Its Federal Office of Information Security (the "BSI") provides
certification services through which information technology products
and systems are tested and certified.286
In the comments to the proposed Security Rule, HI-IS stated that it
encourages professional associations to undertake assessment and im-
plementation activities with respect to HIPAA security requirements. 287
Assuming that the demand for certified products grows dramatically
with the expansion of the "covered entity" definition, it is likely that
some organizations would become interested in providing certification
services for a fee.
If CMS cannot certify the vendors themselves, at the very least it
should certify entities that provide certification services. There is
precedent for this practice as well. Germany's BSI not only certifies in-
282 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8352 (Feb. 20,
2003) (stating that HI-IS has "noted with interest that other Government agencies such as the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are working towards that end").
285 See Nat'l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec. Serv., National Information Assurance Partnership,
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
2" TEMPEST INC., Imp://www.tempest-inc.corn/home.lum (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
TEMPEST INC. "offers TEMPEST/EMSEC and Electromagnetic Compatibility testing and
design services in accordance with current Military, FCC, Australian & European Community
Requirements." Id.
288 Nat'l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec. Serv., Tempest Endorsement Program, http://www.nsa.
gov/ia/industry/tempest.cfm?MenulD=10.23.3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
286 Bundesamt ftir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Department 3: Certification,
Approval and Conformity Testing, New Technologies, http://www.bsi.de/english/depart-
tnent3.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
282 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8352.
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formation technology security products, but also accredits and licenses
evaluation facilities so that they can assess information technology
products and systems. 288
 ISO, a well-respected nongovernmental global
federation established in 1946 to promote "the international exchange
of goods and services" through the creation of uniform standards, 289
has issued several standards that provide best practices guidance to
those operating certification systems. 28° One of these, ISO Guide 65, has
been adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and is applied to
companies operating product certification standards for livestock,
meat, seed, and other agricultural products. 291 CMS also could adopt
appropriate ISO certification guidelines so that it would not have to
wholly invent its own criteria. The certification bodies that are accred-
ited by CMS would in turn certify vendors, and use of the certified ven-
dors' products would create a rebuttable presumption of HIPAA secu-
rity compliance, as described above. 292 The certifying bodies would
have to be recertified by CMS periodically to ensure their continued
competence. Furthermore, the CMS website would list the certifying
. bodies, which would then direct covered entities to the vendors they
have approved.
3. Existing Tools and Emerging Technologies
Ultimately, the electronic PHI security business could develop into
a sophisticated international industry. 298 Some tools that will facilitate
regulatory compliance and certification already exist. These tools can
be used to determine best current practices in various areas covered by
the Security Rule.
ISO and the International Engineering Council ("WC") have pub-
lished a variety of standards describing sound information security prac-
288 Bundesamt far Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, supra note 286.
288 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards
Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 Am. Bus. Li. 237, 240 (2000).
29° ISO, Combined Search Result for "Certification," http://www.iso.org/iso/en/
CombinedQueryResult.CombinedQueryResult?queryString.certification (last visited Feb.
23, 2007).
591 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA ISO Guide 65 Program, http://www.ams.usda.gov/
Isg/arc/iso65.1arn (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
292 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
282 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cyber-
crime, 20 BERKELEY TEcii. L.J. 1553, 1610-11 (2005) (noting that "[w]ith cybercrirnes sky-
rocketing and an ever-increasing amount of sensitive information being exchanged on the
Internet, the development of robust and trustworthy computer systems is a necessity" and
urging that "imlore security-conscious network architects, software designers, and website
developers are the solution").
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tices. The ISO/IEC 17799:2005, entitled "Information Technology—Se-
curity Techniques—Code of Practice for Information Security Manage-
ment," establishes guidelines and "general principles for initiating, im-
plementing, maintaining, and improving information security manage-
ment in an organization" by describing best practices in these areas.294
ISO/1EC 27001:2005 specifies the requirements for initiating, operating,
and monitoring an information security management system in light of
the organization's overall business risks. 295 ISO/EC 15408, known as the
Common Criteria, establishes an international standard for computer se-
curity specifications and evaluations. 298 Finally, ISO 27799, entitled
"Health Informatics—Security Management in Health Using ISO/EC
17799," will apply specifically to health information security, if ap-
proved.297 We reviewed a current draft of ISO 27799 and found it to be
promising, and to provide more thorough and relevant guidance than
currently exists in other documents.
ISO, IEC, and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineer-
ing ("IEEE") have also developed a large number of standards and
guidelines for various aspects of software engineering. Notable examples
include ISO/1EC 90003:2004, entitled "Software Engineering—Guide-
lines for the Application of ISO 9001:2000 to Computer Software," 298
which provides guidance for organizations concerning the acquisition,
supply, development, operation, and maintenance of computer software
and related support services, and ISO/1EC 12207, entitled "Information
Technology—Software Life-Cycle Processes,"299 which establishes a sys-
tem for software life-cycle processes.
In addition, at least one national organization is already devoted to
research and development concerning Internet security. CERT is a fed-
erally funded center of computer security expertise, operated out of
Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute. 509 It stud-
294 ISO, ISO/IEC 17799:2005, http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.Cata-
logneDetail?CSN UM BER=396128eICS1=358cICS2=40SeICS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
299 ISO, ISO/IEC 27001:2005, http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.Cata-
logueDetail?CSNUMBER=421038c1CS1=35&ICS2=408c1CS3=  (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
296 See generally COMMON CRITERIA FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY EVALUA-
TION: USER Gunn,: (1999), available at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/files/
ccusersguide.pdt
297 ISO/DIS 27799, supra note 254.
29g ISO, ISO/IEC 90003:2004, http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogneDetailPage.Cata-
logueDetail?CSNUMBER=35867841GS1=358c1C.S2 -40&ICS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
299 ISO, ISO/IEC 12207:1995, littp://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogneDetailPage.Cata-
logneDetail?C'SNUMBER=212088cICS1=358c1CS2=-808c1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
99° See Carnegie Mellon Univ., Software Eng'g Inst., CERT Coordination Center, http://
www.cert.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
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les Internet security vulnerabilities and long-term changes in net-
worked systems and develops information and training to promote im-
proved security."' Among its other features, CERT's website offers se-
curity alerts and solutions." 2 Certification bodies could require vendors
to follow CERT's recommendations in order to attain certification, and
covered entities not utilizing vendors could also rely on these for guid-
ance.
The NIST, discussed above," 3
 has produced not only important
guidance concerning risk analysis,"4 but also a website entitled "Na-
tional Vulnerability Database."305 The website states that the database is
"a comprehensive cyber security vulnerability database that integrates
all publicly available U.S. Government vulnerability resources and pro-
vides references to industry resources."'"
The list of standards and resources provided above is not meant to
be exclusive, and, because of the ever-changing nature of technology
and security threats, it would be impractical to attempt to develop a
comprehensive list that would endure over time. Certification bodies
should be expected to remain updated concerning guidelines and re-
sources that are relevant to PHI security and should distribute perti-
nent information to their certified vendors. Similarly, under the "best
current practices" standard discussed above, covered entities that do
not take advantage of certified vendors would be expected to follow
applicable industry standards and guidelines for HIPAA compliance
purposes. As an additional aid, CMS should maintain on its website an
updated, nonexclusive list of documents and Internet sources that it
recommends to covered entities.
It should also be noted that in the comments concerning the pro-
posed Security Rule, HEIS acknowledged that it is required to adopt in-
dustry standards developed by standards-developing organizations that
are accredited by the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI"), 5D7
3° 1 Id.
343 Id.
303 See supra notes 154, 263 arid accompanying text.
904 See supra text accompanying notes 251-254.
3°5 National Vulnerability Database, littp://nvd.nist.gov
 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). Al-
though it is produced by NIST, the database is sponsored by the Department of Homeland
Security's National Cyber Security Division. Id.
3°5 Id. As of February 23, 2007, the database contained 22,653 vulnerabilities. Id.
"7 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8345 (Feb. 20,
2003). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(c) (2) (13) (2000) provides that "[ill no standard set-
ting organization has developed, adopted, or modified any standard relating to a standard
that the Secretary is authorized or required to adopt," the Secretary may create his own
standard.
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the U.S. representative of ISO and IEC.508 In 2003, HHS concluded that
the available security standards were not technology-neutral, were incon-
sistent with HIPAA, and were too narrow to be adopted in the final
Rule.309 The advent of ISO 27799, which will specifically address health
information security,"° should cause HHS to reevaluate its conclusion
and may require revision of the Security Rule to include the new stan-
dard's adoption.
It is reasonable to expect that implementation of the proposed
changes to the HIPAA Privacy Rule will influence vendors to provide
relatively low-cost "turnkey" systems for processing and maintaining
PHI that will be affordable even for small businesses. 311 We anticipate
that all but the largest covered entities will lack the expertise and re-
sources to achieve Security Rule compliance without the assistance of
an intermediary, and thus, the development of a market for HIPAA
compliance aids is essential.
A Google search for HIPAA security turnkey solutions reveals a
number of organizations already purporting to provide such solutions
for compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule. 312 Some offer compre-
hensive practice management solutions that combine scheduling, re-
cordkeeping, intr-aoffice communication, and billing in a single appli-
cation, thereby centralizing all HIPAA-related electronic data. 313 Other
products offer tutorials, templates, documents, and aids aimed at ena-
bling an entity to achieve HIPAA compliance. 314 Still other applications
303 ANSI, About ANSI—A Historical Overview, ltp://www.ansi.orgiabout_ansi/intro-
duction/history.aspx?inenuid= I (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
305 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8345.
31° See supra text accompanying note 297.
311 Turnkey systems are "built, supplied, or installed complete and ready to operate."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1274 (10th ed. 1996).
312
 Google Search for HIPAA Security Turnkey Solutions, lutp://www.google.com (last
visited Man 7, 2007).
315 See, e.g., AdvancedMD, http://www.advancedmd.com  (last visited Feb. 23, 2007); Leo-
nardoMD Online Medicine, http://www.leonardomd.cotn (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). There
are two versions of the LeonardoMD product standard and professional. LeonardoMD
Online Medicine, supm. The standard package provides "entry-level practice management
with registration, scheduling, and messaging," and its cost starts at $150 per month with a
one-time $1250 setup charge. Id. The professional package is advertised as providing "com-
prehensive practice management with scheduling, charge capture, billing, and integrated
chart documentation." Id. Its cost starts at $300 per month, with a $2500 setup charge. Id,
314 See, e.g., HipaaManager, http://www.hipaamanager.com/hm/online_hcat.cfm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2007); NewGovernance HIPAA Privacy Accelerator (HPA)—Product Over-
view (v2.2), http://www.newgovernance.com/hpa.html  (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). The
standard version of HipaaManager costs $199, the professional version costs $699, and the
institutional version is priced at $2999. HipaaManager; supra.
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are designed for more complex organizations with more sophisticated
technology. Symantec BindView 515
 is a compliance management appli-
cation that analyzes an organization's current security profile, suggests
modifications based on best practices, and monitors and reports com-
pliance-related data (for example, who is accessing files containing
PHI).316
 SecureInfo RMS317
 claims to cut costs, create a standardized
compliance and accreditation program, and provide packages for regu-
lar auditing." It is likely that increasingly sophisticated and cost-
effective tools will continue to be developed in response to marketplace
demands for security technology.
D. Bolstering Enforcement Through a Private Cause of Action
The HIPAA Privacy Rule's lack of a private cause or action dimin-
ishes its deterrent and remedial powers." We recommend that the pri-
vacy regulations adopt the approach of many of the other U.S. privacy
laws and the E.U. Privacy Directive, and establish a private cause of ac-
tion.52°
The HIPAA Privacy Rule's administrative penalties 321 should be
retained alongside the private right of litigation. This approach will al-
low governmental intervention even when no individuals suffer injury,
such as in cases in which electronic security is inadequately maintained
but no information is actually obtained by unauthorized third parties.
It will also introduce the threat of private enforcement in cases that
would not be prioritized by the government for political reasons or that
the government does not have the resources to pursue, which may be
515
 Symantec, Regulation Solutions, HIPAA, http://www.bindview.com/solutions/re-
gulations/hipaa.cfm
 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
516 Id.
317
 Secureinfo RMS, hup://www.secureinfo.com/solutions/certification-accreditation/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
518 Id.
519 See supra notes 159-193 and accompanying text.
520 See supra notes 159-193 and accompanying text. It is well-established that defen-
dants can be subjected to both criminal penalties and punitive damages for the same
wrong. See United States v. Flajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 (1998) (holding that the Double
jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the institution of both a criminal prosecution and a
later civil in rem forfeiture action); Tuttle v. Raymond. 499 A.2t1 1353, 1357-58 (Me. 1985)
(holding that double jeopardy is nut implicated when a defendant is both criminally
prosecuted and required to pay punitive damages for the same misconduct because the
latter is imposed in a private civil suit rather than a criminal action).
541 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to -6 (2000).
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the vast majority of cases. 322 Without a private cause of action, covered
entities may have incentive to conduct a cost-benefit analysis from
which they conclude that because the cost of compliance is great and
the risk of being penalized for a violation is very small, they should not
aggressively invest in PHI security measures, 325
The dual enforcement approach of a private cause of action and
administrative penalties is adopted by several other U.S. privacy laws. 324
Borrowing from the private cause of action provisions found in other
privacy legislation, we recommend that the HIPAA statute include the
following language325 :
(a) Any person aggrieved by any act of a covered entity in vio-
lation of this section may bring a civil action in a United States
District Court. 326
(b) The court may award—
(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in
the amount of $2500;
(2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless dis-
regard of the law;
(3) reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs rea-
sonably incurred; and
(4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court
determines to be appropriate. 327
322 See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text; see also Stein, supra note 178 (quot-
ing an HI-IS administrator as acknowledging that the agency has "challenges with our re-
sources investigating complaints").
329  See Choi et al., supra note 2, at 62 (predicting that health care providers will need to
expend billions of dollars to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
321 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), (10(1)(1) (2000) (establishing private
cause of action and criminal penalties); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2520, 2522(c) (2000) (establishing private cause of action and civil penalties); Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723-2724 (2000) (establishing criminal pen-
alties and a civil cause of action).
"5 The private cause of action should he added to both the administrative regulations
and the federal statute, given that the means of enforcement are authorized under the
statute itself, See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to 1320(1-6 (2000).
326 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1)(D) (providing for a cause of action
whenever an agency "fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule
promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual");
Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(f) (1) (2000) (providing that "Wiry
person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in violation of this section may bring a civil
action in a United States District Court").
927 See Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (providing identical
language).
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In the future, Congress might consider requiring aggrieved parties
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing lawsuits in court.328
Presumably, such a system would filter out many of the weakest cases
because lawyers and potential litigants would be discouraged by nega-
tive administrative agency findings and would not burden the courts
with frivolous cases. Effective administrative review, however, is depend-
ent upon a strong network of agency offices that are adequately staffed
to process a large volume of claims. HHS's anemic HIPAA enforcement
record indicates that it does not currently have such resources. 329
Some cases brought by private litigants may be complex and large,
with far-reaching impacts. if vendors or certifying bodies are suspected
of being responsible for Security Rule breaches, they could be joined as
defendants33° under theories of negligence or fraud, 331 or be brought
in by covered entities as third party defendants. 332
 In addition, cases
involving Security Rule breaches that injure numerous individuals
could generate class actions with hundreds, thousands, or even millions
of plain tiffs. 333
CONCLUSION
An abundance of evidence confirms that the confidentiality of our
private health information faces grave threats from a large number of
sources. The danger of privacy violations will only intensify in the fu-
ture with increased computerization and centralization of health re-
"a This mechanism has been embraced by several employment discrimination laws, which
establish that potential plaintiffs first must file charges of discrimination with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and receive a determination and/or a right to sue before
filing a lawsuit in court. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b),
(1) (1) (2000) (describing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (the "EEOC's")
charge filing process); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (adopting
Title V1I's enforcement provisions for the ADA); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000) (establishing that civil actions may not be commenced prior
to the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC).
329 See supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (criticizing l-IHS's enforcement of
HIPAA and reporting that as of June of 2006, the agency imposed no civil penalties on
covered entities).
SeeFED. R Civ. P. 20 (discussing permissive joinder of parties).
"I See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction, which allows
tort claims to be joined to related federal statutory claims in some circumstances); FED. R.
Civ. P. 18 (discussing permissive joinder of claims).
"2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction in federal court cases
asserting a federal statutory claim); FED. R. Qv. P. 14 (discussing third party practice).
asp
	 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (discussing class action requirements).
2007]	 Protecting Electronic Private Health Information	 385
cords.SM The U.S. government, which has aggressively promoted the
use of electronic health records, 666 has responded to concerns about
privacy by enacting HIPAA and its privacy regulations. The legislation
and regulations are, however, significantly flawed from both legal and
technical perspectives. Focusing on the HIPAA Security Rule, this Arti-
cle presents recommendations to rectify some of its considerable weak-
nesses.
The new requirements outlined in this Article would need to be
phased in gradually. Just as existing covered entities were given several
years to prepare for compliance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, new cov-
ered entities should be given the same courtesy. Moreover, time will
pass before a sufficiently advanced health information security industry
develops to make effective and affordable products readily available for
covered entities. The HHS Secretary should determine a reasonable
compliance deadline for the newly introduced provisions.
A public education campaign would have to be initiated to educate
the public about its rights under the revised regulations and to educate
newly covered entities about their obligations. Similar efforts were
made when the original privacy regulations were enacted. 336
The H1PAA Privacy Rule represents a significant regulatory effort
on the part of the U.S. government and has generated emotional and
often negative responses from the American public. 337 The recommen-
334 Stein, supra note 178 (stating that "lpirivacy advocates say large, centralized elec-
tronic databases will be especially vulnerable to invasions, making it even more crucial that
existing safeguards be enforced").
335
 Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan Talbott* Compelled Disclosure of Health Information: Protect-
ing Against the Greatest Potential Threat to Privacy, 295 JAMA 2882, 2882 (2006) (discussing the
creation of the Nationwide Health Information Network pursuant to President Bush's call for
the promotion of interconnected electronic health records); Terry & Francis, supra note 1, at
1 (noting that in April of 2004, President Rush announced a plan to ensure that Americans'
health records are computerized within ten years); Office of the Nat'l Coordinator for
Health Info. Tech., Goals of Strategic Framework, http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/goals.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (discussing the goal of computerizing health records to promote
"workflow efficiencies" and improved patient care).
336 See, e.g., HIPAA Compliance Program Offered to Local Companies, DAILY RECORD (Roch-
ester), Dec. 26, 2003, at 1 (reporting that " ttl he Alliance for HIPAA Compliance, a diverse
and well-integrated team of healthcare attorneys, consultants and administrators who are
experts in HIPAA issues, offer a program to assist companies in becoming HIPAA compli-
ant"); Jonna Lorenz, Summit Explains New Health Care Rules, TOPEKA CAPITA[. J., Jan. 15,
2002, at 7A (reporting that "La]bout 300 people gathered at the Kansas Expocentre ... to
learn about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and what they should
do to get their health care organizations into compliance with that legislation").
137 Although the HIPAA statute was passed in 1996, the privacy regulations took years
to develop and did not become effective until 2003. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2006). When it
first published its proposed Rule, FIHS received 2350 public comments about it. Health
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dations detailed in this Article should render the HIPAA Security Rule
in particular and the HIPAA Privacy Rule in general far more meaning-
ful. They should benefit both patients, whose privacy and autonomy are
at stake, and organizations seeking guidance concerning compliance
requirements. It is only with rethinking some of HIPAA's statutory and
regulatory provisions that electronic PHI will truly constitute protected
health information.
Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8335 (Feb. 20, 2003). The Rule's
enforcement provisions were not finalized until 2006. HIPAA Administrative Simplifica-
tion: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb. 16, 2006); see also SOLOVK supra note 13,
at 70 (discussing the controversial nature of the HIPAA regulations).
